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The concept of “reasonableness” permeates the law: the “reasona-
ble person” determines the outcome of torts and contracts disputes,
the criminal burden of proof requires factfinders to reach conclusions
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” and claims of self-defense succeed or fail
on reasonableness determinations. But as any first-year law student
can attest, the line between reasonable and unreasonable is not al-
ways clear. Nor is that the only ambiguity. In the realm of the unrea-
sonable, many of us intuit that some actions are not only
unreasonable but beyond the pale—we might say they are beyond un-
reasonable. Playing football, summiting Nanga Parbat, and attempt-
ing Russian roulette all risk serious injury or death, but most people
do not view them the same. These distinctions raise vexing questions:
What is it that makes us feel differently about these activities? Mere
unfamiliarity? Moral condemnation? Relative utility? Or something
else altogether? Moreover, who exactly is the “we” forming these
judgments?
This Article explores the vague lines that separate our sense of rea-
sonable, unreasonable, and beyond unreasonable—the reasonableness
lines. Part II examines the general characteristics of these lines. Part
III explores their significance in law, and Part IV considers their ap-
plication in four discrete areas of law: tax policy for medical expenses,
criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and tort liability for inher-
ently dangerous sports. The Article ends by summarizing the implica-
tions of the reasonableness lines for our culture and for ourselves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of “reasonableness” permeates the law: the “reasona-
ble person” determines the outcome of torts and contracts disputes,1
the criminal burden of proof requires factfinders to reach conclusions
“beyond a reasonable doubt,”2 and claims of self-defense succeed or
fail on reasonableness determinations.3 But as any first-year law stu-
dent can attest, the line between reasonable and unreasonable is not
always clear. Nor is that the only ambiguity.4 In the realm of the un-
reasonable, many of us intuit that some actions are not only unreason-
able but beyond the pale.
Consider Russian roulette. The odds of dying while playing Rus-
sian roulette are around 17%,5 about the same as the odds of dying
while summiting Nanga Parbat in the Himalayas.6 Most of us find
both risks uncomfortably high. Yet on closer reflection, the two risks
1. See infra Part II.
2. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 40–43 (10th ed. 2017).
3. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
4. There is also the risk of making category mistakes by conflating terms of art
across different domains. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942) (“The tendency to assume that a
word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more
than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them
runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against.”). This Article explores general intuitions under-
lying the concept of reasonableness rather than attempting to parse the differ-
ences between the word used in different legal contexts.
5. Assuming a six-chamber revolver. See Eric W. Weisstein, Russian Roulette,
WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RussianRoulette.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/GK4S-M47K] (last updated June 24, 2020).
6. With a 20% death rate (the ratio of deaths of all climbers who were hoping to
summit and who went above base camp), attempting to summit the Himalayan
peak Nanga Parbat (colloquially known as “Killer Mountain”) is in some ways
even riskier than Russian roulette. See Ben Butcher, How Deadly Is Mount Ever-
est?, BBC (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47418215 [https://
perma.unl.edu/R7ML-FWMQ]. Nanga Parbat is one of fourteen mountains with
summits above 8,000 meters. Id. The death rate for these fourteen mountains
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feel different to many of us. Few people want to climb high in the
Himalayas, but those who do are not typically castigated for their
choices.7 Most of us do not extend the same charitable understanding
to the person playing Russian roulette. We might find both of these
activities inherently dangerous, but we do not think about them in the
same way. Even if both are in a sense unreasonable, pointing a loaded
gun at your head and pulling the trigger seems different than climb-
ing a dangerous mountain. We might think of Russian roulette as be-
yond unreasonable, in contrast to the merely unreasonable sport of
extreme mountain climbing.
Why do many of us find extreme mountain climbing unreasonable
but view as reasonable other recreational activities which also have a
nontrivial risk of death or serious injury, like football? What exactly is
“it” that makes us feel differently about these activities? Is it unfamili-
arity? Moral condemnation? Relative utility? Or something else alto-
gether? And who exactly is the “we” who forms these judgments?8
This Article explores the vague lines that separate our sense of rea-
sonable, unreasonable, and beyond unreasonable, or what I call “the
reasonableness lines.” Part II examines the general characteristics of
the reasonableness lines. Part III explores their significance in law,
and Part IV considers their application in four areas of law: tax policy
for medical expenses, criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and
tort liability for inherently dangerous sports. The Article ends by sum-
marizing three implications of the reasonableness lines. First, they
are socially constructed lines that illustrate the permeability between
law, politics, and culture. Second, they ask individual citizens to iden-
tify with a larger community that pushes wholly subjective beliefs and
experiences into less subjective frames. Third, their communal fram-
ing reveals something of our social ordering and cautions against rigid
distinctions between what we find reasonable, unreasonable, and be-
yond unreasonable.
ranges from around 2% to 30%. Id. According to one estimate, Nanga Parbat has
had 339 successful ascents to the summit and 69 deaths. Id.
7. But see Julia Hollingsworth, Everest Traffic Jam Creates Lethal Conditions for
Climbers, CNN (May 24, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/asia/
everest-climbers-intl/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/HJ3B-ZD5W], for a dis-
cussion of the recent controversy about inexperienced climbers on Everest.
8. I adopt this first-person plural pronoun throughout this Article to describe
broader social views and judgments. Part of the challenge of any socially con-
structed notion of reasonableness is that voices ignored, overlooked, or otherwise
marginalized by the relevant community might rightly reject the terms by which
the community has established its norms. While I recognize these same limita-
tions constrain my use of the first-person plural pronoun, I attempt to limit my
use of the convention to relatively uncontroversial descriptions. The critical
reader might substitute something like “the vast majority of Americans” for my
use of the first-person plural pronoun—I mean for those descriptions to be inter-
changeable in this Article.
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II. THE REASONABLENESS LINES
The reasonableness lines are social and moral judgments. They are
social because they can only be defined by a community of people. To
put this differently, my subjective beliefs cannot by themselves deter-
mine reasonableness. It might turn out that my beliefs align with the
sense of reasonable of the community in which I find myself. Or I may
have beliefs that are outliers relative to that community. But I will not
know the reasonableness of my own subjective beliefs apart from the
community that judges those beliefs.
These social judgments about reasonableness sometimes change. A
hundred years ago, it would have been beyond unreasonable to sug-
gest that two men should be allowed to marry each other. Today,
same-sex marriage is permissible, and it is also considered reasonable
by a majority of Americans.9 We could make similar observations (us-
ing different time spans) about arguments for cohabitation, marijuana
use, and many gender norms. Conversely, a hundred years ago, argu-
ments supporting Jim Crow would have been reasonable to many
white Americans. Today, these arguments are beyond unreasonable to
almost everyone.10 It is entirely possible, and probably likely, that our
descendants a hundred years from now will have other examples of
the shifting lines of reasonableness. As Jeffrey Stout has argued, the
context that justifies our current beliefs could change: “It is perfectly
conceivable that we will someday be justified in deviating significantly
from the beliefs we are currently justified in believing.”11
At the same time, not all of our views seem open to change. For
example, arguments for ritual child sacrifice have always been beyond
unreasonable in the United States—an example of what Stout calls an
“underlying social agreement.”12 This limitation on ritual child sacri-
9. Based on data from Pew Research Center, 61% of Americans support same-sex
marriage, while 31% oppose it. Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-
marriage/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7RAG-4PCV]. This is almost the direct inverse
of data from 2004, where 60% of Americans opposed same-sex marriage and 31%
supported it. Id. This example shows how quickly an idea can shift from unrea-
sonable to reasonable.
10. But see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1 (2012) (“The arguments and rationalizations that have
been trotted out in support of racial exclusion and discrimination in its various
forms have changed and evolved, but the outcome has remained largely the same.
An extraordinary percentage of black men in the United States are legally barred
from voting today, just as they have been throughout most of American history.”).
11. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 233 (2004). Because our justifications
are warranted in our context, “it would be foolish to address our justifications to
the audience of all rational agents, regardless of time or place.” Id. at 236. Stout
argues this is humility, not skepticism. Id. at 233.
12. Id. at 277.
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fice also illustrates why no society is ever fully pluralistic: every soci-
ety sets limits on its acceptable differences.13
The reasonableness lines are moral judgments that differ from ob-
jective assessments. We can illustrate the difference between reasona-
bleness and objectivity by considering the “reasonable person” in law.
This standard prevents an individual from relying upon a wholly sub-
jective sense of harm, fear, duty, or care; the reasonableness of my
actions is not simply whatever I think is reasonable, it is also a social
judgment that incorporates the views of other people. For example, I
will not succeed in a defense involving the use of deadly force simply
because I actually feared for my life. My subjective fear is a necessary
but not sufficient element of self-defense: I must have actually been in
fear, and my fear also must have been reasonable.
This less subjective assessment is not an objective assessment.
Consider the “reasonable man” standard that preceded today’s “rea-
sonable person.” Susan Estrich observes that the earlier standard’s
neglect of gender differences required a woman who was violently sex-
ually assaulted to resist her assailant in every way possible:
In a very real sense, the “reasonable” woman under [this] view . . . is not a
woman at all. [This] version of a reasonable person is one who does not scare
easily, one who does not feel vulnerability, one who is not passive, one who
fights back, not cries. The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy
“sissy.” She is a real man.14
Today’s reasonable person improves upon the reasonable man stan-
dard but continues to elide important differences pertaining to cul-
ture, physical stature, and other characteristics.15 For example, in at
least some circumstances, as when an assailant is running toward
someone with a non-deadly weapon, the reasonableness of the re-
sponse of a frail old woman will be judged differently than that of a
strong young man. These differences are intuitive to most people. And
13. These limits vary and have varied across societies, which is one reason why em-
pirical appeals to universal human rights are generally unpersuasive. See
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 325 (2008) (“It is impos-
sible to develop a secular account of human dignity adequate for grounding
human rights. Or to speak more cautiously: given that, after many attempts, no
one has succeeded in developing such an account, it seems unlikely that it can be
done.”); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES
11 (rev. ed. 2000) (“There is no intelligible (much less persuasive) secular version
of the conviction that every human being is sacred . . . .”); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 16 (2006) (“[W]hat
ground one who is not a religious believer can give for the claim that every
human being has inherent dignity is obscure.”).
14. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1114 (1986).
15. See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 187 (2004) (noting
shortcomings of the “reasonable person” standard for people from non-Western
cultures); Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law:
Fighting the Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435 (2010) (noting the
complexities of the “reasonable person” standard).
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yet, there is also a darker side of the subjectivity of reasonableness
when we consider whether there is such a thing as a “reasonable ra-
cist.”16 These tensions highlight the impossibility of establishing an
“objective” reasonable person: there is always a tradeoff between gen-
eralizing assumptions and recognizing individual characteristics.
Nor is reasonableness the same as objective truth. A reasonable
belief or action may in fact be ontologically or theologically correct, or
it may simply appear to be correct in a given epistemic context.17 Re-
latedly, the reasonableness lines do not by themselves establish or im-
ply moral differences or similarities between reasonable or
unreasonable beliefs or acts. I may think that efficient breach of a con-
tract and the use of deadly force in self-defense are both reasonable,
but that does not mean I assign to them the same moral significance.
Similarly, I may find both the Russian roulette player and the Nanga
Parbat climber to be beyond unreasonable, but that does not mean I
equate the harm of their actions.
Because reasonableness is a moral concept, it also differs from ra-
tionality.18 Determining the reasonableness of a belief or action usu-
ally draws upon moral frameworks, while assessing the rationality of
a belief or action relies upon the internal logic of a belief or the coher-
ence of the justification of an action.19 The philosopher John Rawls,
following Kant, drew a similar distinction in a section of Political Lib-
eralism titled “The Reasonable and the Rational.”20 Rawls pointed to
an example from everyday language: “We say: ‘Their proposal was
perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but it was
16. A well-known example is New York City subway vigilante Bernhard Goetz’s ar-
gument that he reasonably feared for his life when he shot four unarmed Black
teenagers. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1990).
17. This Article makes no ontological or theological claims about the reasonableness
lines but neither does it preclude the existence of transcendent truths of “good”
and “bad” that exist independently of contingent legal, political, or cultural
discourses.
18. See Polycarp Ikuenobe, Rationality, Practical Reasonableness, and the Social and
Moral Foundation of a Legal System, 32 J. SOC. PHIL. 245, 260 (2001) (“Reasona-
bleness is not equivalent to morality, but reasonableness implies morality, and
rationality does not . . . .”); REASONABLENESS AND LAW, at xii (Giorgio Bongi-
ovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009) (“[R]easonableness draws
on moral considerations . . . and cannot be reduced to correctness of reasoning or
to instrumental rationality.”). But see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HU-
MANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 10–11 (2004) (arguing that irrational is
itself slippery, potentially meaning “devoid of thought” or “bad thought in some
normative sense” (emphasis omitted)).
19. See Ikuenobe, supra note 18.
20. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–54 (1993) (“In justice as fairness the rea-
sonable and the rational are taken as two distinct and independent basic ideas.”).
Rawls credits Kant with one of the earliest distinctions between these two terms.
Id. at 48 n.1.
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nevertheless highly unreasonable, even outrageous.’”21 In other
words, the analytical soundness of a conclusion that follows from a
given premise tells us little about whether the conclusion is morally
sound or normatively good.22 Peter Singer’s defense of infanticide may
be entirely rational given his premises.23 But many people still find
his premises highly unreasonable.24 The rational coherence of a syllo-
gism does not allow us to assess the normative reasonableness of its
conclusion.25
Of course, rationality is not itself fully detached from broader
moral frameworks. Rawls warned against some moral philosophers
who “think the rational is more basic” and who suggest that “the rea-
sonable can be derived from the rational.”26 He rejected these asser-
tions, arguing instead that reasonableness and rationality both
connect to “a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the
good . . . taking into account the kind of social cooperation in question,
the nature of the parties and their standing with respect to one an-
21. Id. at 48.
22. See id. at 50 (“The rational . . . applies to a single, unified agent (either an indi-
vidual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seek-
ing ends and interests peculiarly its own. The rational applies to how these ends
and interests are adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority.
It also applies to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by such familiar
principles as: to adopt the most effective means to ends, or to select the more
probable alternative, other things equal.”).
23. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 12–14 (3d ed. 2011) (endorsing prefer-
ence utilitarianism over hedonistic utilitarianism, meaning the utilitarian
calculus should consider whether the number of preferences is maximized as op-
posed to the net gain in pleasure); id. at 153–54 (defending the practice of
infanticide).
24. E.g., Kevin Toolis, The Most Dangerous Man in the World, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5,
1999, 7:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/1999/nov/06/week-
end.kevintoolis [https://perma.unl.edu/4ULE-6S58] (describing some of the reac-
tions to Singer’s claims).
25. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 51. Rawls situated his contrast between rationality and
reasonableness within the “justice as fairness” framework of his own political
theory. Id. (“What rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility
that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on
terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse.”). He also
believed that the lack of moral framework does not mean that rationality is either
limited to means-ends reasoning or to considerations of self-interest. Id. at 50–51
(“[R]ational agents are not limited to means-ends reasoning, as they may balance
final ends by their significance for their plan of life as a whole, and by how well
these ends cohere with and complement one another. Nor are rational agents as
such solely self-interested: that is, their interests are not always interests in ben-
efits to themselves. Every interest is an interest of a self (agent), but not every
interest is in benefits to the self that has it. Indeed, rational agents may have all
kinds of affections for persons and attachments to communities and places, in-
cluding love of country and of nature; and they may select and order their ends in
various ways.”).
26. Id. at 51.
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other.”27 The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has similarly argued
that rationality, like reasonableness, depends upon underlying tradi-
tion-bound assumptions and beliefs about what makes a particular
kind of discourse logical or coherent.28 This recognition that both rea-
sonableness and rationality draw upon social influences helps to show
why neither of these concepts can lay claim to pure objectivity.29
That said, some forms of rationality are more culturally embedded
than others. We would consider the person who believes that two plus
two equals four to be rational and the person who thinks otherwise to
be irrational. But not all forms of rationality are so undisputed. For
example, people sometimes appeal to “rational” argument to gain the
upper hand in a contentious debate or to imply that an opposing view
is “irrational.”30 Some political theorists make a similar move with
Rawls’s concept of “public reason,” suggesting that we can distinguish
between arguments acceptable to public discourse and those that can-
not be justified with commonly accessible premises.31 These appeals
27. Id. at 52.
28. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 222 (3d ed. 2007) (“[A]ll reasoning takes
place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, transcending
through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been rea-
soned in that tradition; this is as true of modern physics as of medieval logic.
Moreover when a tradition is in good order it is always partially constituted by an
argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particu-
lar point and purpose.”); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATION-
ALITY? 350 (1988) (“There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to
engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting rea-
soned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or
other.”).
29. See Chad Flanders, The Mutability of Public Reason, 25 RATIO JURIS 180, 200–02
(2012) (suggesting that cultural and social forces can generate new forms of rea-
soning); Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1459,
1481 (1996) (describing how “novel political arguments” could over time “become
part of the public political culture”).
30. See, e.g., Jennifer Lackey, The Irrationality of Natural Life Sentences, N.Y.
TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 1, 2016, 3:21 AM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2016/02/01/the-irrationality-of-natural-life-sentences/ [https://perma.unl.
edu/FUA3-ZQH7]; The Editorial Bd., Trump’s Irrational Border Plan, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/opinion/trumps-national-
guard-border.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2Q23-2B6M] (“Such a move has at best
a tenuous basis in law and none in logic, and it will burn through federal funds
better spent elsewhere.”). For an argument that one’s political opponents are not
irrational, see Gary Gutting, Are Your Political Opponents Crazy?, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (Aug. 2, 2011, 3:57 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/08/02/are-your-political-opponents-crazy/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7ERZ-
RNXE] (listing examples like John McCain calling opponents of the debt-limit
increase “worse than foolish” and Paul Krugman suggesting that President
Obama’s desire to compromise might be “obsessive and compulsive”).
31. For a collection of the best known arguments for and against this use of Rawls’s
public reason argument, see THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
AND RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS (J. Caleb Clanton ed., 2009).
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to a common rationality ignore the ways in which we all are commit-
ted to particular beliefs that we cannot prove.32
As a practical matter, most of us live in an uneasy tension when it
comes to rationality. We accept many “common sense” observations at
face value: few of us could get by in the world if we rejected the asser-
tions of rationality underlying mathematical arguments. At the same
time, few of us are comfortable accepting every claim of “objective” ra-
tionality, particularly when those claims are exacerbated or misused
by partisans. In other words, most of us are neither nihilists nor naifs.
But we often disagree about those things which we ought to accept at
face value and those toward which we ought to express skepticism.33
As the preceding discussion suggests, the reasonableness lines con-
nect not only to law (where they often but not always determine legal-
ity) but also to politics and culture. In law, the reasonableness lines
factor into judgments about permissible and impermissible activities.
Reasonable actions are often (but not always) permissible and unrea-
sonable actions are often (but not always) impermissible. In politics
and culture, which lack the overt coercive force of law, reasonableness
affects judgments about acceptable and unacceptable beliefs and ac-
32. See LESSLIE NEWBIGIN, PROPER CONFIDENCE: FAITH, DOUBT, AND CERTAINTY IN
CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP 24 (1995) (“So long as we continue to live we continually
act on the assumption that certain things are true and others not.”).
33. The global pandemic that hit the United States in 2020 led to numerous exam-
ples of contested claims about what science and evidence required or did not re-
quire with respect to public health measures. See, e.g., Jennifer Frey, Political
Wisdom and the Limits of Expertise, BREAKING GROUND (July 2, 2020), https://
breakingground.us/political-wisdom-and-the-limits-of-expertise/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/36N6-TFCU] (discussing conflicting guidance from public health
experts as to the safety of attending protests). The 2019 impeachment of Donald
Trump provides another example. Compare The Editorial Bd., Trump Has Been
Impeached. Republicans Are Following Him Down, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/opinion/trump-impeachment-vote.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/EPK3-6ELR] (“By any reasonable measure, Mr. Trump’s
own conduct in office clears the bar for impeachment set by the founders. The
case against him is that he solicited foreign interference to help in his 2020 re-
election campaign, that he used hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to do it,
that his administration tried to hide the evidence and that he then blocked Con-
gress from performing its constitutionally mandated role of checking the execu-
tive branch. Multiple government officials, some appointed by the president
himself, have confirmed all of these facts.”), with House Democrats Impeach
Trump, Pelosi Floats Holding Up Senate Trial, FOX NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
www.foxnews.com/us/house-democrats-impeach-trump-pelosi-senate-trial
[https://perma.unl.edu/86JC-44LD] (“Without any Republican support, the House
on Wednesday night voted to impeach President Trump for ‘abuse of power’ and
‘obstruction of Congress’ related to his dealings with Ukraine, making Trump the
third American president ever to be impeached. The separate votes on the two
counts teed up an all-but-certain acquittal in the Senate, should House Demo-
crats forward the charges to the GOP-controlled chamber. They also fulfilled a
promise made by some Democrats ever since Trump’s inauguration to impeach
him, even as polls have shown a decline in public support for the action.”).
384 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:375
tivities. Reasonable arguments are usually more persuasive than un-
reasonable ones, and arguments that are beyond unreasonable often
(but not always) encounter a level of social disapproval that places
them outside of the boundaries of polite society.34 Notions of reasona-
bleness in one of these domains can also influence notions of reasona-
bleness in another: law does not always follow culture any more than
culture always follows law, but contested notions of reasonableness in
each of these domains spill over into the other.35
The reasonableness lines are usually more fluid in politics than
they are in law.36 One reason for this greater dynamism in politics is
that law usually depends upon administrable and enforceable stan-
dards. In contrast, political discourse is often more exploratory, and
its reasonableness lines often more contested. This is particularly the
case for issues on which there is widespread disagreement. Today, for
example, millions of Americans support total bans on abortion, and
millions of Americans advocate for complete integration of trans-
gender athletes in all levels of women’s sports.37 Yet in both examples,
millions of other Americans see no plausible argument for embracing
these policy suggestions as law.38 These widespread disagreements
34. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 3 (1963) (describing the effects of stigmatizing an individual “from a
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one”).
35. A number of scholars have noted the complicated relationship between law and
culture. See, e.g., Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 839, 841 (2011) (comparing the “historical school” which sees
law as a product of culture with the “constitutive approach” which sees law as
creating culture); Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
485, 487 (2003) (“[L]aw does not merely enforce antecedent cultural norms.”).
36. See Maggie Astor, How the Politically Unthinkable Can Become Mainstream,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/us/politics/over-
ton-window-democrats.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JD9K-R4VL] (citing exam-
ples of changing policy preferences like Medicare for all, 70% top tax rate, and
abolishing Immigration and Customs Enforcement); Tom Perriello & Felicia
Wong, Bold Versus Old, DEMOCRACY (May 18, 2018, 1:39 PM), https://.org/argu-
ments/bold-versus-old/ [https://perma.unl.edu/W8UH-SEVS] (citing examples
like criminal justice reform, free community college, $15 minimum wage, and pri-
vacy rights).
37. See PRRI Staff, The State of Abortion and Contraception Attitudes in All 50
States, PRRI (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.prri.org/research/legal-in-most-cases-
the-impact-of-the-abortion-debate-in-2019-america [https://perma.unl.edu/XXS5-
AVDX] (15% of Americans said abortion should be illegal in all cases); Most Op-
pose Transgender Athletes on Opposite Sex Teams, RASMUSSEN REP. (June 4,
2019), https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/social_issues/
most_oppose_transgender_athletes_on_opposite_sex_teams [https://perma.unl.
edu/8952-ZK4E] (28% of American adults favor allowing transgender students to
participate on the sports team of the gender with which they identify).
38. See PRRI Staff, supra note 37 (21% of Americans believe that abortion should be
legal in all cases); Most Oppose Transgender Athletes on Opposite Sex Teams,
supra note 37 (54% of American adults oppose integration of transgender
athletes).
2020] BEYOND UNREASONABLE 385
prevent either side from effectively casting the other as politically be-
yond unreasonable despite rhetorical efforts to that effect, as when
anti-abortion advocates call their opponents “baby killers” or trans-
gender advocates say that their opponents are “denying our
humanity.”39
Political reasonableness usually requires ideas to gain some degree
of salience with a critical mass of voters.40 In some cases, politicians
restrain their discourse for tactical or strategic reasons, as when Pres-
ident Barack Obama muted his support for gay marriage in 2008,41 or
when Vice President Joe Biden struggled to determine his position on
the Hyde Amendment (restricting federal funding for abortion) in
39. See Chris Cameron, Trump Repeats a False Claim That Doctors ‘Execute’
Newborns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/28/us/
politics/trump-abortion-fact-check.html [https://perma.unl.edu/3ULW-87RB]
(describing President Trump’s comments at a rally that “the doctor and the
mother determine whether or not they will execute the baby”); Erin Allday, ‘De-
nying Our Very Humanity:’ Trump Proposal Wounds Bay Area Transgender Com-
munity, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
health/article/Denying-our-very-humanity-Trump-proposal-13346647.php
[https://perma.unl.edu/3C7N-H6FZ]; see also Alexandra Desanctis, Gillibrand
Compares Being Pro-Life to Being Racist, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2019, 1:58 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/kirsten-gillibrand-compares-being-pro-
life-to-being-racist/ (New York senator and Democratic presidential candidate
Kirsten Gillibrand comparing anti-abortion views to racism). The lack of political
consensus over what is deemed beyond unreasonable will not prevent individuals
from concluding on an interpersonal level that certain groups or other individuals
are beyond unreasonable. Issues like abortion and transgender rights remain po-
litically contested but some individuals on both sides of these issues find them-
selves unable to engage with the other side.
40. One model for understanding fluidity in politics is the “Overton Window,” a con-
cept first introduced in the 1990s by Joseph P. Overton, an executive at the
Mackinac Center for Public Policy. See Astor, supra note 36. The concept con-
tends that:
[P]oliticians are limited in what policy ideas they can support—they gen-
erally only pursue policies that are widely accepted throughout society
as legitimate policy options. These policies lie inside the Overton Win-
dow. Other policy ideas exist, but politicians risk losing popular support
if they champion these ideas. These policies lie outside the Overton
Window.
The Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, https://www.mackinac.org/
OvertonWindow [https://perma.unl.edu/VNY9-XHEJ] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
The key insight of the Overton Window is that shifts normally begin with the
public; generally, “the window moves based on a . . . complex and dynamic phe-
nomenon, one that is not easily controlled from on high: the slow evolution of
societal values and norms.” Id.
41. Obama expressed support of legalizing same-sex marriage as early as 1996 but
asserted in 2008 that he believed “marriage is the union between a man and a
woman.” Zeke J. Miller, Axelrod: Obama Misled Nation When He Opposed Gay
Marriage in 2008, TIME (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:54 AM), https://time.com/3702584/gay-
marriage-axelrod-obama/ [https://perma.unl.edu/N2KH-KWDM]. His political
strategist David Axelrod advised him to conceal his support of same-sex marriage
for political reasons. Id.
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2019.42 Yet even these examples reveal the different ways that politi-
cally motivated constraints on political discourse negotiate the reason-
ableness lines: in 2008, Obama would have been out in front of many
national political figures had he supported gay marriage;43 in 2019,
Biden was the sole holdout among major Democratic candidates in his
continued support of the Hyde Amendment.44 Obama’s shift would
have been seen as more unreasonable in 2008 than Biden’s shift in
2019.
Sometimes politics prevents law from adopting policies viewed as
reasonable. Take court reform, for example. Most Americans believe
that fixed terms rather than life appointments are reasonable for Su-
preme Court Justices.45 Yet political dynamics and pressures have
precluded serious consideration of such a court reform plan.46 Or con-
sider gun control. Almost all Americans support requiring background
checks for gun sales.47 But despite years of support, legislation requir-
ing universal background checks has never passed, likely due to politi-
cal divisions.48
The final domain of culture permits more unrestrained discourse,
especially in isolated circles. For this reason, even though political dis-
42. See Maggie Astor, Joe Biden on Abortion and the Hyde Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/joe-biden-abor
tion-hyde-amendment.html [https://perma.unl.edu/QZ4K-2Q2R]; Katie Glueck,
Joe Biden Denounces Hyde Amendment, Reversing His Position, N.Y. TIMES (June
6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/us/politics/joe-biden-hyde-amend
ment.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5HDV-TF2R].
43. Andrew Jacobs, For Gay Democrats, a Primary Where Rights Are Not an Issue,
This Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/us//
28gay.html [https://perma.unl.edu/J35D-H6ES] (noting that, during the 2008 pri-
mary, “many gay leaders said they are unhappy that none of the Democrats have
embraced the cause of gay marriage”).
44. Katie Glueck, Biden Still Backs Hyde Amendment, Which Bans Federal Funds
for Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/
politics/biden-hyde-amendment.html [https://perma.unl.edu/494X-6S7T].
45. CHARLES H. FRANKLIN, PUBLIC VIEWS OF THE SUPREME COURT 21 (Oct. 2019),
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MULawPollSupreme
CourtReportOct2019.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/X8XQ-RSN6].
46. See, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129
YALE L.J. 148 (2019); Ryan C. Black & Amanda C. Bryan, The Policy Conse-
quences of Term Limits on the U.S. Supreme Court, 42 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 821
(2016); Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the
Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131 (2003).
47. Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx [https://perma.unl.
edu/U2W3-ZS5K] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (finding that 92% of respondents sup-
port requiring background checks for gun sales).
48. Domenico Montanaro, Americans Largely Support Gun Restrictions to ‘Do Some-
thing’ About Gun Violence, NPR (Aug. 10, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/08/10/749792493/americans-largely-support-gun-restrictions-to-do-some-
thing-about-gun-violence [https://perma.unl.edu/E4Y7-M9UL] (noting that the
National Rifle Association’s long-term opposition to universal background checks
may have prevented such legislation from moving forward).
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course usually requires some semblance of current or future plausibil-
ity, cultural discourse can envision or imagine social constructs that
nearly everyone rejects as implausible. Cultural discourse also occurs
more broadly and more frequently than legal and political discourse.
All of us are shaped by legal and political discourse, but not all of us
directly participate in those discourses. In contrast, almost everyone
participates in some form of cultural discourse: we share ideas and
form beliefs in schools, workplaces, and churches; we react to (and in-
creasingly participate in) media, social media, and entertainment; and
we argue with family and friends about everything under the sun. As
these examples suggest, the vast majority of cultural discourse is rela-
tively mundane. It is sometimes more provocative at its fringes.
Perhaps most interestingly, some fringe cultural arguments even-
tually gain traction with a broader audience—they move from fringe
to mainstream, then into political discourse, and eventually, some of
them even move into legal discourse.49 As fringe arguments spread,
they can also move from beyond unreasonable to merely unreasona-
ble—and sometimes they even become reasonable. Importantly, this
transition from fringe to mainstream is not simply a matter of how
many people accept the reasonableness of a belief. All new, innovative,
shocking, and disruptive ideas begin with a small minority of society.
Sometimes these ideas capture widespread social support on the way
to becoming less unreasonable.
The line between unreasonable and beyond unreasonable in cul-
tural discourse helps determine the boundaries of acceptable soci-
ety.50 For example, many people would find a conservative or liberal
ideologue unreasonable but a neo-Nazi or anarchist beyond unreason-
able. The religious zealot may be unreasonable, but the religious theo-
crat is beyond unreasonable. The libertarian who argues for
abolishing all taxes is unreasonable, but the libertarian who defends
the full autonomy of toddlers is beyond unreasonable. These lines can
have stark consequences for movements and individuals: cultural dis-
course that migrates into political and legal discourse gives rise to
prophets; cultural discourse that remains on the fringes makes
pariahs.
III.  THE REASONABLENESS LINES IN LAW
When social determinations of reasonableness enter the domain of
law, they sometimes constrain behavior with the use or threat of
49. The example of gay marriage illustrates such a shift in a remarkably short time
frame. See Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 9 (shifting from
2004–2019).
50. See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 34.
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force.51 But not all unreasonable acts are illegal, and not all reasona-
ble acts are legal. Instead, reasonableness in law is further situated by
legal permissibility and impermissibility.52 We can think about the
relationship between permissibility and reasonableness with the 2x2












51. The analysis in this Part focuses primarily on substantive determinations of rea-
sonableness as distinct from the important question of how a legal tradition cre-
ates and sustains the meaning of reasonableness itself. An important example of
the latter is the development of “artificial reason” in the common law tradition.
See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD
U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155 (2002) [hereinafter Postema (Part I)]; Gerald J. Pos-
tema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMON-
WEALTH L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Postema (Part II)]. As Jeffrey Pojanowski
observes, common law jurists did not view artificial reason as an appeal to uni-
versal principles (natural law), but as “a product of discipline, argument, and
experience that seeks to identify, or approximate by construction (‘artifice’), the
community’s shared reason on social problems. Artificial reason aspires to find
the ‘convergence of the views and judgments of the larger community, and forging
and maintaining a common sense of reasonableness.’” Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1388
(2015) (quoting Postema (Part II), supra, at 10).
52. Without law, many of us would feel and act less constrained, which would at once
bring more autonomy and less stability. Left without any meaningful constraints,
we would also cease to be a meaningful political community. As Hobbes recog-
nized, the absence of any constraints is the absence of society. See THOMAS HOB-
BES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1651). A related
question of political theory is whether a society’s laws are pragmatically oriented
to maintaining public order or teleologically oriented toward some notion of “the
good” or a “just society.” One can imagine a society in which the only justification
for some constraint is to maintain public order and safety. But laws based on
notions of reasonableness also restrain behavior for other reasons.
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Quadrant I captures the vast majority of unconstrained actions
that people take in the world: actions that are both reasonable and
permissible. Quadrant III covers constrained actions that most people
do not take: actions that are both unreasonable and impermissible.
These quadrants are fairly straightforward and, apart from borderline
cases, uncontroversial. The relatively uncontroversial nature of most
of the actions we take and do not take should also remind us of our
shared humanity. When it comes to our sense of reasonableness, most
of us agree more than we disagree.53
Quadrant IV represents actions that provoke some of our strongest
disagreements: impermissible actions that many people find reasona-
ble. For example, a woman who steals food to feed her starving child is
likely guilty of theft, but many people would judge her actions reason-
able under the circumstances.54 Another category of reasonable but
impermissible actions are those that the law classifies as strict liabil-
ity offenses: sometimes we punish people even if they have no idea
that their actions are illegal and have no intent to violate the law.55 If
you pick up a Native American artifact on federal land,56 you may be
guilty of a felony even if you had no idea that the object in your posses-
sion was illegal to possess. Sometimes we even punish eminently rea-
sonable actions: jaywalking on an empty street,57 parking in front of
Dunkin’ Donuts in a non-emergency,58 or having an alcoholic beverage
within 150 feet of a barbeque grill.59
Quadrant IV also captures unenforced laws: actions we deem rea-
sonable under current cultural and political norms but that remain
53. See, e.g., A. Barton Hinkle, Americans Agree More than They Might Realize, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.richmond.com/opinion/our-opinion/
a-barton-hinkle-column-americans-agree-more-than-they-might/article_d6ec93f
9-f56b-5081-a4e4-f8f71643a04b.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TA4F-MATM] (not-
ing at least 70% agreement on issues like alternative energy, handgun bans,
sanctuary cities, extremist bigotry, medical marijuana, civil asset forfeiture, and
universal background checks); Linton Weeks, A Nation Divided: Can We Agree on
Anything?, NPR (Feb. 28, 2012, 10:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2012/02/28/1473
38798/disagreeable-america-can-t-we-all-just-get-along [https://perma.unl.edu/
38VM-N5RD] (more than 90% of Americans believed in God, supported troops
who served overseas, and thought developing good math skills was important).
54. The law accounts for some of these situations through the doctrines of necessity
and duress, which render legal an otherwise illegal action when the circum-
stances support the reasonableness of the action. See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Crimi-
nal Law § 135 (2020) (necessity); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 137 (2020)
(duress).
55. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 139–44 (8th ed. 2018).
56. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
57. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.48 (West 2019) (“pedestrian crossing road-
way outside crosswalk” is minor misdemeanor).
58. SOUTH BERWICK, ME., TOWN ORDINANCES art. III, § 15 (2019). The donut store is
now called just “Dunkin’,” but the law does not appear to have been updated at
the time of this writing.
59. PAGEDALE, MO., CODE § 210.750(b)(2) (1992) (repealed Jan. 11, 2018).
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technically impermissible.60 For example, laws against fornication re-
main “on the books” in some jurisdictions.61 Four hundred years ago,
fornication was widely prosecuted and would have fallen easily within
Quadrant III.62 Today, fornication has moved to Quadrant IV: it re-
mains impermissible in some jurisdictions but is generally viewed as
reasonable. We can also illustrate this shift by considering the cul-
tural and political reasonableness of a restriction against fornication.
Two hundred years ago, enacting a law against fornication would have
been unquestionably reasonable. Today, an effort to establish such a
law would be beyond unreasonable, even to those who maintain per-
sonal or religious objections to fornication.63
Quadrant II represents activities that are legally permissible but
are generally viewed as unreasonable: eating cats and dogs,64 mar-
rying your first cousin,65 or publicly uttering a racial slur.66 Absent
extenuating circumstances, these activities are generally legal. But at
60. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 591 (2001) (“[T]he statute books contain a host of crimes that are not
crimes at all in terms of popular understandings. Prosecutors’ incentives being
what they are, these crimes are likely to go largely unenforced.”).
61. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West 2019) (“A person commits forni-
cation when he or she knowingly has sexual intercourse with another not his or
her spouse if the behavior is open and notorious.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (2019)
(“When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each
is guilty of fornication, which is a misdemeanor.”). However, the trend seems to
be that state courts will find these laws unconstitutional if they are presented
with the issue. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05-CVS-267, 2006 WL 3103008
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006) (holding state fornication statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-184 (West 1994), violates substantive due process); In re J.M., 575
S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003) (holding state fornication statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18
(West 2010), was unconstitutional as applied).
62. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 35
(1994) (“[I]n the seventeenth century, no crimes appear more often in the ancient
pages of court records than fornication and other victimless crimes.”).
63. The fact that individual and institutional objections to fornication can persist
even as it becomes increasingly reasonable and permissible is one reason to doubt
certain conservative religious arguments for the necessity of morality-based laws.
See Scott Keyes, Conservatives Aren’t Just Fighting Same-Sex Marriage. They’re
Also Trying to Stop Divorce., WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/opinions/conservatives-arent-just-fighting-same-sex-marriage-they
re-also-trying-to-stop-divorce/2014/04/11/5f649bd6-bf48-11e3-bcec-
b71ee10e9bc3_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/K9FM-5U8M]; Deborah L.
Rhode, Why Is Adultery Still a Crime?, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2016, 5:00 AM), https:/
/www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rhode-decriminalize-adultery-20160429-
story.html.




66. See infra section IV.C.
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least in most parts of the country, they are quickly condemned in cul-
ture and politics: legally permissible but culturally unreasonable.67
These four quadrants are not always clearly differentiated, partic-
ularly when we consider the interaction between permissibility and
reasonableness in law. In some cases, the law requires an assessment
of reasonableness to determine whether an activity is permissible. We
can illustrate with the example of homicide, which is the killing of a
human being by another human being.68 Many homicides are not
crimes: they are both permissible and reasonable. The woman who
kills in self-defense, the police officer who kills to protect the life of
another, and the soldier who kills an enemy combatant are all justi-
fied in their actions.69 In this sense, justified homicides fall within
Quadrant I. But on closer inspection, these conclusions of permissibil-
ity depend upon assessments of reasonableness. Whether an act of
self-defense is permissible depends upon how we assess the reasona-
bleness of the fear, imminence, and threat of harm that the killer per-
ceived in the moment. Similar reasonableness assessments underlie
all excused or justified homicides.
These puzzles and ambiguities are not confined to criminal law but
also underlie important doctrines across many areas of law. In each
case, the law’s reasonableness assessments serve as proxies for social
judgments. And across all of these areas of law, the category of reason-
ableness lacks mathematical precision: a “reasonable doubt” is “inher-
ently qualitative”;70 the “reasonable person” is a composite of
67. Id.
68. Homicide is further complicated by differing statutory definitions of “human be-
ing” between jurisdictions. In at least one case, these varying definitions resulted
in a child being declared legally dead in one state (California) before being trans-
ported to a different state (New Jersey) and then declared legally alive. See
Rachel Aviv, What Does It Mean to Die?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/what-does-it-mean-to-die [https://
perma.unl.edu/UP8R-DMJV].
69. An excused homicide may not have been proper, but it is still adjudicated as non-
culpable because it is reasonable; in some jurisdictions, the person who kills
under duress acts reasonably. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law: Substantive Principles
§ 49 (2020) (describing excuse, which “recognizes the criminality of conduct, but
excuses it because the actor reasonably but mistakenly believed that circum-
stances actually existed that would justify that conduct”); id. § 52 (discussing
duress).
70. McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983); see also Cage v. Louisiana,
498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (discussing reasonable doubt), overruled by Estelle v. Mc-
Guire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); KADISH, SCHULHOFER & BARKOW, supra note 2, at
40–43 (discussing reasonable doubt).
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subjective and objective considerations;71 and “reasonable” time,
place, and manner restrictions can be highly contextualized.72
Sometimes the ambiguity of an action in law is not between rea-
sonable and unreasonable but between unreasonable and beyond un-
reasonable.73 Figure 2 introduces an additional line to the earlier
chart that signifies this divide: activities to its left are beyond unrea-
sonable and activities to its right (but to the left of the original vertical














The additional line separating unreasonable and beyond unreason-
able facilitates two further observations. First, even some activities
that are culturally and politically beyond unreasonable remain legally
permissible: these acts are represented by Section IIa. The example of
71. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (discussing subjectivity of
reasonableness).
72. For critiques of the reasonableness of time, place, and manner restrictions under
the modern public forum doctrine, see John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s
Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1180–82 (2015). There, I argue that
focusing on content-neutrality “misses the expressive connection between speech
and the time, place, and manner in which it occurs.” Id. at 1181. Time restrictions
“can sever the link between message and moment”; place and manner restrictions
can have similar effects. Id.
73. Cf. Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the Application of Rule 11
Sanctions: What is “Frivolous”?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677, 698 (1999) (“Indeed, there
may be a difference between a claim that has ‘no chance of success’ and one that
has ‘absolutely no chance of success,’ a difference that is perhaps best illustrated
through a continuum that measures reasonableness.”).
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Russian roulette falls within this category.74 Section IIa also includes
some egregious acts of omission, which are generally not criminalized:
the man who does nothing to stop his friend from assaulting a young
child,75 the bystanders who fail to call the police when they hear a
screaming woman,76 the passersby who allows a victim of an automo-
bile accident to drown in an inch of water.77 Each of these inactions is
legally permissible, but most people would find them beyond
unreasonable.
The second observation illustrated by the additional line in Figure
2 plays out in the difference between IIIa and IIIb: the law distin-
guishes between unreasonable and beyond unreasonable among the
activities that it proscribes. In other words, the law signals and enacts
political and cultural distinctions between unreasonable and beyond
unreasonable actions.
Consider again the example of criminal homicide. Most of us think
that people who commit criminal homicide—people who kill without
justification or excuse—are acting unreasonably.78 But the law does
not treat all criminal homicides the same. For example, many jurisdic-
tions distinguish between intentional and unintentional criminal
homicide. Roughly speaking, criminal homicides committed purpose-
fully or knowingly are usually punished as murder, and those commit-
ted recklessly or negligently are punished as the lesser offense of
manslaughter.79 But many jurisdictions also encode additional social
judgments in distinguishing between culpable homicides. Some
murders are designated as more severe than others through designa-
tions like “premeditated” and “first-degree” (both of which differ from
74. There does not appear to be an express prohibition on Russian roulette in any
U.S. jurisdiction.
75. See Cathy Booth, The Bad Samaritan, TIME (June 24, 2001), http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,139892,00.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
4LJ9-DEWX]; Rachel Crosby, In Strohmeyer Case, ‘Bad Samaritan’ David Cash
Led to New Law, L.V. REV.-J. (May 19, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://www.reviewjour
nal.com/crime/homicides/in-strohmeyer-case-bad-samaritan-david-cash-led-to-
new-law/ [https://perma.unl.edu/VZ39-QZ2T].
76. Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
27, 1964), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1964/03/27/
97175042.html?pageNumber=1 [https://perma.unl.edu/EJ2E-5J4A] (discussing
murder of Kitty Genovese); THE WITNESS (Five More Minutes Productions 2015)
(documentary showing brother of Kitty Genovese investigating the circumstances
of her murder).
77. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE 78 (1991).
78. We also believe this about people whose culpability is excused for reasons of in-
sanity or diminished capacity.
79. See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501–04 (West 2019) (dividing
criminal homicide into murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary man-
slaughter, largely along these lines).
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“purposeful”).80 And some unintentional homicides are punished as if
they had been committed intentionally when they are committed with
“depraved indifference,” which characterizes the conduct leading to
death as an intolerable blend of high risk, low utility, and moral
blameworthiness.81 In light of these distinctions, we could say that
while all criminal homicides are legally impermissible and unreasona-
ble, premeditated murder and depraved indifference manslaughter
often warrant special condemnation—they are beyond
unreasonable.82
We can also illustrate the differences between Sections IIIa and
IIIb with the example of reckless driving. Driving offenses are usually
considered conduct offenses: we punish the behavior when it is de-
tected and prosecute regardless of whether someone is harmed.83 In
other words, our theory for punishing driving offenses is based on the
risk of the activity rather than the harm it causes. But in practice, we
view driving offenses differently. Think about the political and cul-
tural differences between three different forms of reckless driving:
speeding, texting while driving, and driving drunk. We could identify
80. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West 2019) (murder in the first degree
involves causing the death of a human being “with premeditation and with in-
tent”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2019) (criminal homicide constitutes mur-
der if person “purposely causes” death); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 2502
(dividing murder into three degrees).
81. See, e.g., People v. Bussey, 970 N.E.2d 404, 407 (N.Y. 2012) (“[D]epraved indiffer-
ence murder is ‘extremely dangerous and fatal conduct performed without spe-
cific homicidal intent but with a depraved kind of wantonness.’” (quoting People
v. Payne, 819 N.E.2d 634 (N.Y. 2004))).
82. Generally, but not always. Joshua Dressler’s criminal law casebook illustrates
the difficulty of classifying all premediated murders as especially heinous with
the case State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987), cited in JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 505 (6th ed. 2012). The defendant in Forrest was
convicted of premeditated murder after shooting his terminally ill father in the
head to end his suffering. Dressler notes:
Premeditation and deliberation might only reflect “the uncertainties of a
tortured conscience rather than exceptional depravity.” Compare, for ex-
ample, a person who impulsively pushes a small child sitting on a bridge
into the river to a loving child who kills her terminally ill parent after
long and careful consideration in order to end the parent’s suffering.
Under current law, if “premeditation” means anything, the impulsive
killer is guilty of second-degree murder, and the mercy killer might be
guilty of first-degree murder. Yet, as a function of depravity or danger-
ousness, most people would reverse the results.
Id. at 504–05 (footnotes omitted).
83. Id. at 114 (“Some crimes are defined, at least in part, in terms of harmful con-
duct. Harmful results are not required. An example of a ‘conduct’ crime would be
the offense of ‘intentionally driving under the influence of alcohol.’ . . . This is a
so-called ‘conduct’ crime because no harmful result is required to be guilty of the
offense.”). Conduct offenses are distinguished from result offenses, which focus on
the harm that occurs. Id. (“An offense may be defined in terms of a prohibited
result. Common law murder is a ‘result’ crime, because the social harm of the
offense, as defined, involves ‘the death of another human being.’”).
2020] BEYOND UNREASONABLE 395
the risk factors underlying these different forms of reckless driving
and posit examples of each in which the risk of harm is identical (e.g.,
we could identify a speed, a level of texting, and a blood alcohol level
that created equal levels of distraction or incapacitation). The harm to
society represented by engaging in any of these three actions at those
levels of risk would be identical. And yet there are ways in which the
act of driving drunk seems “worse”—or more unreasonable—than ei-
ther speeding or texting while driving. For example, many social and
professional settings uniquely stigmatize drunk driving arrests and
convictions: think of the perceived differences between a DUI citation
and a citation for speeding or texting while driving. The law also re-
flects some of these differences. Many jurisdictions elevate the punish-
ment for vehicular homicide while intoxicated far above vehicular
homicide while speeding (at least if the speeding is below a certain
threshold).84 In other words, the law often signals that killing some-
one while driving drunk is beyond unreasonable whereas killing some-
one while speeding is unreasonable (or sometimes even reasonable).
Even more perplexing, it appears that Americans drive drunk with
alarming frequency. As a society, we may say that driving drunk is
unreasonable or beyond unreasonable, but we do not act as if it is—
according to one poll, 69% of American adults admit to having driven
while buzzed.85
We can add one more twist to the drunk driving example to show
how our intuitions of unreasonableness might also be linked to the
motive underlying the act. Consider the case of Jennifer Axelberg.86 In
2011, Axelberg was arrested for driving drunk in rural Mora, Minne-
sota. She and her husband had been drinking with friends at a remote
lake cabin when he started beating her on the head. At two a.m., she
ran to her car for protection and he chased after her. Once she entered
the car, he pounded on the windshield so hard it began to shatter. She
had no cell phone (he had taken it from her), so she drove off while
intoxicated to find safety.
Do we think of Axelberg driving drunk in the same way that we
think of a college student who drives after drinking too much at a
84. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-106 (West 2019) (homicide while driving
recklessly is a Class 4 felony; homicide while driving under the influence of alco-
hol is a Class 3 felony); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.1 (2019) (allowing intoxicated of-
fender to be charged with “crime of violence” and providing for higher
sentencing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-213 (West 2019) (homicide while driving
recklessly is a Class C felony; homicide while driving under the influence of alco-
hol is a Class B felony).
85. Drinking and Driving Habits, ALCOHOL.ORG, https://www.alcohol.org/guides/
drinking-and-driving-habits/ [https://perma.unl.edu/JP86-5D32] (last visited July
12, 2020).
86. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)
(describing the facts that follow), aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014).
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party? What if she had driven down a crowded city block but not
harmed anyone? What if she had struck and killed someone while
driving for help in rural Mora? Our intuitions about the reasonable-
ness of Axelberg’s conduct likely account not only for her actions but
also for her motive, the risk of harm created by her actions, and the
actual harm (if any) resulting from her actions.87 But that amalgam of
factors means that we might assess identical actions or identical mo-
tives quite differently depending on the overall context.
Having set out the framework for the reasonableness lines, we can
now turn to some applications in law.
IV.  APPLICATIONS
The following four sections illustrate the ambiguities of the reason-
ableness lines across four areas of law: tax policy for medical ex-
penses, criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and tort liability for
inherently dangerous sports.88
A. Unreasonableness in Tax Policy
One way the law approximates the line between unreasonable and
beyond unreasonable is through tax policy. Tax exemptions and de-
ductions define what qualifies as contrary to well-established public
policy,89 what counts as a reasonable charitable deduction,90 and
what qualifies as a legitimate real estate expense.91 But the baseline
for reasonableness is not always obvious.92
87. In the actual case, which did not involve harm to a third party, the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected Axelberg’s necessity defense. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d at 206.
88. These four examples are illustrative but not exhaustive. For example, what quali-
fies as “frivolous” for sanctions under Rule 11? See Levine, supra note 73, at 678
(arguing for a continuum in Rule 11 sanctions “which will allow and require
courts to assign a value of reasonableness to claims that come before them”); see
also Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 537 (1986) (arguing for
spectrum of reasonableness in Rule 11 context with “three distinct zones: (1)
clearly reasonable; (2) clearly unreasonable; and (3) a mid-zone where the con-
duct cannot be readily categorized”).
89. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
90. See Stephen Labaton, Clinton Taxes Laid Bare, Line by Line, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/16/us/clinton-taxes-laid-bare-line-
by-line.html [https://perma.unl.edu/YJ3D-6M23 ] (“[T]he Clintons had gone so far
as to deduct $2 for underwear donated to charities.”).
91. French v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1990) (allowing write-off for private
plane used to check on rental condo).
92. Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 538 n.63
(1994) (“According to Rawls, conscientious disobedience of tax laws is inappropri-
ate because reasonable minds may differ: it is never clear when such laws are
unjust.”); Thomas J. Schenkelberg, Not-for-Profit Perspective, 28 J. COMPENSA-
TION & BENEFITS 8 (2012) (analyzing “rebuttable presumption of reasonableness”
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Consider the line drawing implications of deductions for medical
care expenses. Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code allows tax-
payers to deduct expenses “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body.”93 Should this deduction cover cos-
metic surgery? The Internal Revenue Code has defined limits on the
deductibility of such expenses since 1942.94 The limits initially al-
lowed deductions for cosmetic surgery “for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body.”95 That led to a series of cases and
rulings over the deductibility of hair transplants and facelifts.96 In
1990, Congress altered the provision to clarify that deductions for the
cost of cosmetic surgery would only be allowable for surgery “neces-
sary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a
congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident
or trauma, or disfiguring disease.”97 This clarification led to addi-
tional ambiguity, particularly around issues related to medical treat-
ment of gender dysphoria.
In 2010, the tax court addressed deductions for treatment of male-
to-female gender dysphoria involving hormone therapy, sex reassign-
ment surgery, and breast augmentation surgery.98 Following a
lengthy consideration of evidence pertaining to the medical necessity
of these treatments, the court concluded that hormone therapy and
sex reassignment surgery were allowable medical deductions.99 How-
ever, it denied the deduction for breast augmentation surgery because
the petitioner had already achieved “normal breasts” through hor-
for executive compensation in 501(c)(3) organizations); Kristi R. Sutton & Inan
Uluc, If It Looks Like a Duck, Swims Like a Duck, and Quacks Like a Duck, It Is
Probably a Duck! – Whether Late-Filed Tax Returns Constitute “Returns” for Pur-
poses of Discharge Under § 523, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 111 (2019) (discussing rea-
sonableness in the context of late-filed tax returns).
93. I.R.C. § 213(a), (d)(1)(A) (2012). In general, “expenses serving both medical and
personal objectives are not deductible if the medical benefit is secondary or re-
mote, if the expenses would have been incurred even in the absence of the medi-
cal condition, or if the mode of achieving the medical benefit is needlessly
expensive.” BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 36.2 at *3 (2020).
94. See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 48 (2010).
95. Id.
96. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
143 (7th ed. 2015).
97. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘medical care’ does not include
cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is
necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congeni-
tal abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfig-
uring disease.”).
98. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 54–63.
99. Id. at 69. Specifically, the court concluded that these procedures were medical
treatments used to alleviate suffering that fell outside of the Code’s definition of
cosmetic surgery. Id. at 70.
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mone therapy.100 From that baseline, the court concluded that breast
augmentation surgery was not deductible because it “[did] not mean-
ingfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat
illness or disease.”101 In reaching this conclusion, the court encodes its
own version of reasonableness with words like “normal” and “proper”
and its assessment of the petitioner’s objectives relative to those de-
scriptions.102 And by elsewhere allowing deductions for reconstructive
breast surgery following a mastectomy,103 its distinctions between
motives and purposes illustrate the close link between what it deems
“reasonable” and what it considers normatively appropriate.
Another application of Section 213’s medical care deduction show-
ing the granular nature of the reasonableness lines pertains to the
deductibility of costs for medically-advised travel.104 In 1949, the tax
court ruled against a couple claiming the medical deduction for ex-
penses for travel to better climates.105 The case involved a Penn-
sylvania woman whose cardiologist recommended that she go to the
seashore in humid months and Arizona during the winter after she
100. Id. at 72. The court concluded that the surgeon’s presurgical notes and other con-
temporaneous documentation indicated that the petitioner’s breasts before the
surgery “were within a normal range of appearance” and found no documentation
“concerning petitioner’s comfort level with her breasts ‘in the social gender role.’”
Id. at 72–73. Judge Halpern’s concurrence criticized the court’s interpretation of
the contemporary evidence but nevertheless agreed with the court’s disallowance
of the deduction. Id. at 77–78 (Holmes, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 72 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B)
(2006)); see also id. at 100 (Holmes, J., concurring) (“O’Donnabhain’s new base-
line having been established through hormones, I would hold that the surgery
was directed at improving—in the sense of focused on changing what she already
had—her already radically altered appearance.”). Judge Holmes’s concurrence
suggested that the majority’s “extensive analysis” about the medical necessity of
sex reassignment surgery “drafts our Court into culture wars in which tax law-
yers have heretofore claimed noncombatant status.” Id. at 85. Holmes also as-
serted that the court’s “discussion of the science is . . . weak even by the low
standards expected of lawyers.” Id. at 92.
102. See, e.g., id. at 72 (majority opinion) (petitioner already had “normal breasts”); id.
at 72–73 (discussing I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)’s requirement that cosmetic surgery does
“not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body”). The court also con-
cluded that “cross-gender hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery are
well-recognized and accepted treatments for severe [gender identity disorder].”
Id. at 70. As a result, “a ‘reasonable belief’ in the procedures’ efficacy is justified
[here].” Id.
103. Id. at 90–91 (Holmes, J., concurring).
104. The Code of Federal Regulations elaborates that “an expenditure which is merely
beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a
vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)
(2020).
105. Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 413 (1949).
2020] BEYOND UNREASONABLE 399
suffered a coronary occlusion.106 The court found the physician’s ad-
vice insufficient to establish the necessary link between the treatment
and the medical condition.107 Three weeks later, the tax court held in
favor of a family that deducted travel-related medical expenses.108 Af-
ter their daughter was diagnosed with bronchitis bordering on pneu-
monia, her parents discussed with her doctor whether she should
move to Arizona.109 Her father claimed deductions for the costs of the
travel to Arizona and the costs of enrolling her in a boarding school
there. The court allowed deductions for cost of travel and maintenance
(meals, lodging, and medical facilities),110 concluding that the treat-
ment bore a “reasonable relation” to the illness.111 Both of these cases,
decided weeks apart, involved a medically prescribed move to warmer,
more hospitable climates. But the court upheld the deduction in one
and denied it in the other. Other cases raise similar line-drawing
questions around reasonableness.112
106. Id. at 409. In 1945, Havey and her husband spent July in New Jersey, were again
in New Jersey for ten days in October, and spent six weeks in Arizona between
November and December. Id. at 410.
107. In disallowing the woman and her husband to deduct their travel and mainte-
nance expenses, the court noted that “the record does not specifically link the
treatment of coronary occlusion with a change of climate” and specified that
“[t]he generally accepted treatment is restricted activity, rest, and the proper use
of certain drugs.” Id. at 412. The court also considered it significant that the
couple had previously traveled to Atlantic City and Arizona on vacations; that
their first trip happened twenty months after the health problem arose; and that
the timing of the trips did not correspond to the worst periods of weather, as
would be expected if seeking to mitigate climate-related symptoms. Id. at 413.
108. Stringham v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 580, 586 (1949).
109. Id. at 581.
110. Id. at 586. The court allowed part of the boarding school deduction, making a
distinction between educational and medical expenses. The court rejected the de-
duction for educational expenses: “[t]he child’s attendance at school appears to us
to have been merely an additional activity, unrelated in any way to the cure or
alleviation of the disease from which she was suffering.” Id. But the amount allo-
cated to medical expenses seems fairly arbitrary: “[s]ince it is impossible from the
record to accurately determine what proportion of the tuition charged by the
school represented the cost of medical facilities or the child’s meals and lodging,
we have selected the figure of $850 of the total amount paid by petitioner to the
school.” Id. A concurrence argued that the decision to keep the girl in Arizona for
six months could not reasonably be viewed as intended merely to treat a specific
episode of bronchitis, but must have been intended also to prevent her from
catching any further illnesses; as prevention is allowable under the statute, the
same outcome results. Id. at 587 (Murdock, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 585 (majority opinion). In situations such as this one, where it is not imme-
diately evident that the deductions were for a medical rather than a personal
expense, the facts must be considered carefully. Id. at 584.
112. In Tautolo v. Commissioner, the tax court’s disallowance of deductibility of medi-
cal expenses seemed at least partially linked to its perceived reasonableness of
the treatment. Tautolo v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975). Following paral-
ysis from a massive stroke, Faamaise Tautolo and her husband traveled to Sa-
moa at the suggestion of family members after nearly twenty physicians opined
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Some cases are more obvious. From 2004 to 2005, New York tax
lawyer William Halby claimed medical deductions for the costs of por-
nography, prostitutes, and materials on sex therapy.113 Halby did not
discuss his actions with any doctors, nor had any doctor recommended
any of these activities as a form of treatment for any condition. The
tax court noted that the expenses for prostitutes were non-deductible
since prostitution was illegal in New York, and that the pornography
and sex therapy materials were personal items, not part of the treat-
ment for a specific medical condition.114
that her case was “virtually hopeless.” Id. Native Samoan doctors unsuccessfully
treated Faamaise with “prayer and massages with plant leaves.” Id. The court
accepted the couple’s testimony that the “sole motivation for traveling to Samoa”
was for Faamaise’s medical care. Id. at 1199. However, the court found this moti-
vation insufficient to “demonstrate a direct or proximate relation between the
expense and the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease,”
elaborating that the couple had apparently accepted “American medical practice”
and turned to the Samoan doctors only as a last resort, despite not knowing of
any cases of successful treatment for such an illness. Id. at 1200. In Harris v.
Commissioner, the court concluded that a diabetic man could not deduct as a
medical expense the cost of foods bought per a prescribed diet. Harris v. Comm’r,
46 T.C. 672, 674 (1966). The court noted “that where special food or beverage is
taken as a substitute for food or beverage normally consumed by a person and
satisfies his nutritional requirements, the expense incurred is a personal ex-
pense.” Id. at 673. A decade later, however, in Randolph v. Commissioner, the
court approved the deduction of two taxpayers who took a medical deduction for
organic foods. Randolph v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 481 (1976). The couple both had ex-
treme sensitivity to chemicals that often contaminate foods due to pesticides, her-
bicides, and packaging. Id. at 483–84. The cost of organic foods was
approximately twice as much as conventional food, and the couple claimed a de-
duction for the additional cost. Id. at 484. The court found that, on these facts,
“the additional expense [the taxpayers] incurred in restricting their diets to
chemically uncontaminated food is an expense incurred for medical care deducti-
ble to the extent allowable under section 213.” Id. at 485. In distinguishing this
case from Harris, the court noted that the couple only sought a deduction for the
additional cost of the organic food, and they provided ample evidence of the cost
difference as well as the medical need and the medical benefit of their diet. Id. at
488–89.
113. Halby v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 57930 (2009). The IRS rejected the following
expenses as medical deductions: for 2004, “(1) $2,368 for medical books,
magazines, videos, and pornographic material; (2) $65,934 for prostitutes; and (3)
$5,632 in bank and finance charges incurred in connection with loans used to pay
for the claimed medical expenses”; and for 2005, “(1) $5,005 for books, magazines,
videos, and pornographic materials; and (2) $42,152 for prostitutes.” Id. at 3–4.
114. Id. at 7. But see Darla Mercado, 5 Weird Tax Deductions the IRS Has Allowed,
CNBC (Mar. 7, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/07/5-weird-tax-
deductions-the-irs-has-allowed.html [https://perma.unl.edu/LVK6-ELX7] (build-
ing swimming pool to lose weight or buying clarinet lessons to correct an overbite
could be deductible as medical expenses); Robert W. Wood, 10 Crazy Sounding
Tax Deductions IRS Says Are Legit, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:18 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/01/26/10-crazy-sounding-tax-deductions-
irs-says-are-legit/#37ab3d593bcc [https://perma.unl.edu/2C96-L5ZC] (citing tax
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Taken together, these cases demonstrate the tax court’s efforts to
distinguish between legitimate medical deductions and those that are
merely personal expenses. In some cases, the court considers potential
non-medical benefits from the expense and attempts to balance differ-
ing cultural and religious views on medicine.115 The court also looks to
whether a treatment is “generally accepted” for the illness at issue.116
Some treatments are excluded if the court finds them inconsistent
with the taxpayer’s prior medical decisions, which may exclude alter-
natives that individuals seek only after the failure of conventional
medical treatments.117 The net effect of these decisions signals that
some expenses are reasonable (and therefore deductible), some are un-
reasonable (and disallowed), and some are even beyond unreasonable.
More generally, deductions under the Internal Revenue Code illus-
trate how the reasonableness lines play out in law and policy. Once
Congress decides to subsidize only some medical expenses through de-
ductions, a certain amount of line-drawing is inevitable. And those
lines may serve as proxies for contested notions of reasonableness. De-
nying a subsidy is not the same as prohibiting a practice. But the re-
fusal to subsidize may maintain or generate social stigma, sometimes
intentionally.118 Here, as elsewhere, the law’s determination of rea-
sonableness bleeds into politics and culture.
B. Unreasonableness in Criminal Punishment
One of the clearest illustrations of the murkiness of the reasona-
bleness lines and their connections to law, politics, and culture is the
way that we punish. Consider three examples of criminal punishment:
amputation of a hand, the death penalty, and incarceration. These
court cases that allow deductions for exotic dancer’s breast augmentation,
bodybuilder’s body oil, and junkyard owner’s pet food).
115. E.g., Tautolo, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200 (indicating that the court would “pass no
judgment on the competence of native Samoan doctors or the efficacy of the treat-
ments they administer” and discounting the relevance of their lack of medical
degrees).
116. Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
117. Tautolo, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1198.
118. See, e.g., Amy Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of the IRS to
Determine Tax-Exempt Status According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of
Judicial Deference, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117, 125 (2014) (“Section 501(c)(3) exemp-
tions and corresponding § 170 deductions are thus culturally more about ap-
proval and stigma than they are simply about paying more taxes than a
university otherwise would.”); Russell J. Upton, Comment, Bob Jonesing Baden-
Powell: Fighting the Boy Scouts of America’s Discriminatory Practices by Revok-
ing Its State-Level Tax-Exempt Status, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 857 (2001) (“By
revoking the B.S.A.’s state-level tax exemption, New Jersey can send a powerful
message that the state government officially disapproves of the B.S.A.’s anti-gay
policy. . . . [I]f tax-exemption revocation officially stigmatizes the B.S.A., more
municipalities and public school systems will seek to distance themselves from
the organization, further undermining B.S.A. support.”).
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forms of punishment all inflict stigma, violence, and humiliation upon
the wrongdoer.119 In past societies, each of these three forms of pun-
ishment would have been reasonable under law, politics, and culture.
Today, they are perceived quite differently from one another in this
country: most Americans view amputation of a hand as beyond unrea-
sonable,120 there is a sharp and heated debate as to the reasonable-
ness of capital punishment,121 and many Americans view solitary
confinement as reasonable, despite strong evidence of psychological
and other harms resulting from that form of confinement.122
Perhaps even more surprisingly, some forms of punishment far
more benign than any of these three are viewed as unreasonable or
even beyond unreasonable. Consider the use of shaming sanctions:
criminal punishments deliberately aimed at stigmatizing or humiliat-
ing a wrongdoer. One of the more common examples of shaming sanc-
tions follows in the tradition of The Scarlet Letter: requiring those
convicted of crimes to wear or post signs indicating their transgres-
sions. In one case, a judge ordered the defendant to wear a sandwich
119. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
120. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (2001)
(“If the reference to ‘life’ in the Double Jeopardy Clause is to be read in isolation,
and as forever insulating the death penalty from constitutional evaluation, it
would follow that ‘limb’ should be as well, thus apparently insulating the ampu-
tation of an arm or leg from invalidation as a cruel and unusual punishment—a
conclusion we can confidently label ridiculous.”); Connie S. Rosati, A Study of
Internal Punishment, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 123, 131 (1994) (“Amputation of a limb,
for instance, is a paradigm case of cruel and inhuman punishment.”). Yet, other
countries continue to use amputation as a form of punishment—which further
illustrates the social and contextual nature of the reasonableness lines. See, e.g.,
Melanie Reid, Crime and Punishment, a Global Concern: Who Does It Best and
Does Isolation Really Work?, 103 KY. L.J. 45, 57 (2014) (“In many countries such
as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Mali, and Iran, amputation is used as a form of
punishment and serves as an extremely powerful deterrent.”).
121. See J. Baxter Oliphant, Public Support for the Death Penalty Ticks Up, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/11/us-sup-
port-for-death-penalty-ticks-up-2018/ [https://perma.unl.edu/L7Y5-46AJ] (noting
that in 2018, 54% of Americans favored the death penalty for people convicted of
murder and 39% opposed it).
122. See Katie Jagel, Support for Solitary Confinement, YOUGOV (Oct. 9, 2013, 1:56
PM), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2013/10/09/us-pris-
ons [https://perma.unl.edu/9SUJ-HNHN] (56% view solitary confinement as ap-
propriate, while 13% view solitary confinement as a form of torture). Even the
question of where we punish raises important issues of reasonableness. Today,
the premise of incarceration is generally accepted as reasonable, and most incar-
ceration occurs far outside of the public eye. In contrast, incarceration was rela-
tively rare in colonial America and criminal penalties were “intentionally exacted
in full view of the community, which represented an ideal of behavior that the
shamed one should emulate.” Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame
Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/
16/us/crime-and-punishment-shame-gains-popularity.html [https://perma.unl.
edu/NG24-5TQH].
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board with the words “I stole mail” after his conviction for mail
theft.123 Another defendant had to post a sign at the end of his drive-
way which stated: “Warning! A Violent Felon lives here. Enter at your
own risk!”124 These kinds of sanctions may be humiliating, but it is
unclear why they are any more unreasonable than most other forms of
criminal punishment, almost all of which involve humiliation and
shame.125 The perp walk, the mug shot, the spectacle of the trial, and
the administration of post-release parole conditions can all humiliate,
stigmatize, and shame.126 Yet all of these are viewed as reasonable
while shaming sanctions are not.
These questions of reasonableness extend to other controversial
sanctions like corporal punishment. The imposition of state-sanc-
tioned physical trauma on the body is an example of a form of punish-
ment generally viewed as beyond unreasonable by most members of
society.127 But why is this the case? Peter Moskos asks a version of
this question in his book, In Defense of Flogging: “Given the choice
between five years in prison and ten brutal lashes, which would you
choose?”128 Moskos elaborates in graphic detail about each of these
123. United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004).
124. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1997). Dan Kahan cites this example in
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
631–35 (1996). See also, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
J.L. & ECON. 365, 365–66 (1999) (describing one city’s shaming punishment and
arguing that shaming “may offer a cost-effective and politically acceptable alter-
native to the short terms of imprisonment that [white-collar] offenders now typi-
cally receive”); id. at 367 (“Many white-collar offenders—of the conventional
variety—are also being shamed. In Cincinnati, for example, a judge ordered a
corporate executive to write letters of apology and to publish newspaper ads pub-
licizing his company’s contamination of the groundwater with carcinogenic chem-
icals. In New York, a slumlord was sentenced to house arrest in one of his rat-
infested buildings (where tenants greeted him with a banner that read, ‘Wel-
come, Reptile!’). In lieu of a 10-year prison sentence, a Minnesota woman con-
victed of embezzling $195,000 for gambling had to publish a letter of apology to
her community. Ohio farmers convicted of ‘steer swapping’—a fraud to win prize
money in fairs—were forced to own up publicly to being ‘cheaters.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
125. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1998) (“[E]very punishment can involve some element of
shaming.”).
126. For some wrongdoers, ongoing requirements like sex offender registries perpetu-
ate the stigma and humiliation well after time has been served.
127. Generally, but not always. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, What to Know About the Ala-
bama Chemical Castration Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/politics/chemical-castration.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/E3LD-XGGC].
128. PETER MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF FLOGGING 2 (2013). When I ask this question to
the students in my first-year criminal law classes, the preference is overwhelm-
ingly for flogging; in fact, in ten years of teaching, only one student has indicated
a preference for prison over flogging.
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alternatives.129 He notes that while flogging is “a severe and even bru-
tal form of punishment” in which “skin is literally ripped from the
body,” the punishment of incarceration may be much worse:
Five years in prison is a long time. Where were you five years ago? Perhaps
you’ve accomplished a lot in the past half-decade. Perhaps you had ambitious
plans for the next five years. Whatever your plans were, they’re not going to
happen now. Before they lead you out the back of the courtroom to a holding
room, you seriously ponder many things about prison you’ve tried hard to
avoid. Your lover or spouse may leave you (or at least have an affair).
Whatever you’re needed for, you’re not going to be there. If you have kids,
they’re going to miss you, and be missed by you. Over the coming years, will
your friends visit? And if they don’t, what can you do? There’s a very good
chance that, when you emerge after your time is up, you’re going to be alone
and unemployed.130
The costs of prison are even higher when we account for the physical
and psychological realities of incarceration for many inmates.131
The example of criminal punishment leaves us with uncomfortable
questions about the reasonableness lines. What we think is reasona-
ble or unreasonable differs significantly from earlier times in Ameri-
can history and from the judgments of other countries today.132 And
even on our own terms, it is not clear why shaming sanctions are per-
ceived to be worse than incarceration, or why flogging is beyond the
pale but years of solitary confinement is still a permissible punish-
ment. As the next section demonstrates, we find similar puzzles when
it comes to our views about speech, especially when we consider
changes over time.
129. Id. at 2, 4.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the Violence
of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/
30/us/inside-americas-black-box.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4X9J-WG8X] (in-
cluding photos sent to the New York Times from the inside of an Alabama prison);
Alysia Santo, Prison Rape Allegations Are on the Rise, MARSHALL PROJECT (July
25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/25/prison-rape-
allegations-are-on-the-rise [https://perma.unl.edu/J5B4-MLS7] (“The [Bureau of
Justice Statistics] has estimated that more than 200,000 inmates are sexually
abused in American detention facilities annually.”); Mika’il DeVeaux, The
Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 258–61
(2013) (discussing studies regarding negative psychological effects of incarcera-
tion). DeVeaux was himself a prisoner: “I found the prison experience traumatic
because of the assaults and murders I witnessed while incarcerated [and] be-
cause of the constant threat of violence . . . . [T]he threat of violence was real and
ever present.” Id. at 264–65.
132. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Thief’s Hand as Punish-
ment, HAARETZ (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/saudis-cuts-off-thief-s-
hand-as-punishment-1.5346966 [https://perma.unl.edu/4K42-B86N].
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C. Unreasonableness in Speech Restrictions
In 1838, a disaffected minister named Abner Kneeland declared
himself a pantheist, arguing that the God worshipped by Christians
was “nothing more than a mere chimera of their own imagination” and
that the story of Jesus was “a fable and a fiction.”133 For these words,
Kneeland was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for
blasphemy.134 Today, most Americans would find it beyond unreason-
able to imprison someone for disparaging a deity.135 And yet, some
countries today imprison and even execute people for blasphemy.136
In 1940, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing religious literature on
a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, New Hampshire.137 When a
city official confronted him, Chaplinsky called him a “damned racket-
eer” and a “damned Fascist.”138 Chaplinksy was charged and con-
victed under a statute prohibiting offensive speech directed at others
in a public place.139 Two years later, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction, reasoning that “[a]rgument is unneces-
sary to demonstrate that the appellations . . . are epithets likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace.”140 Today, it is hard to imagine Chaplinsky’s words pro-
voking someone to physical violence, let alone sending him to jail for
uttering them.
In 1968, nineteen-year-old Paul Robert Cohen walked into a Los
Angeles courtroom wearing a jacket emblazoned with three words, the
second and third of which were “the draft,” and the first of which was
a four-letter imperative rhyming with “truck.”141 Cohen’s jacket led to
his arrest, prosecution, and conviction for violating California’s crimi-
nal restrictions on “offensive conduct.”142 The Supreme Court held
133. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 207 (1838).
134. Id. Kneeland appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which
sustained his conviction. Id.
135. Angelina E. Theodorou, Which Countries Still Outlaw Apostasy and Blasphemy?,
PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/
29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
2R72-FE7L] (“The U.S. does not have any federal blasphemy laws, but as of 2014,
several U.S. states . . . still had anti-blasphemy laws on the books. However, . . .
the First Amendment . . . would almost certainly prompt a court to ban the en-
forcement of any such law.”).
136. Id. (“[M]en [in Sudan] face the death penalty for following a different interpreta-
tion of Islam than the one sanctioned by the government. . . . Blasphemy—de-
fined as speech or actions considered to be contemptuous of God or the divine—is
[also] a capital crime in Pakistan.”).
137. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 574.
141. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
142. Id. at 22.
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otherwise: the state could not criminalize Cohen’s jacket-wearing. Af-
ter all, as the Court noted, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”143
Perhaps taking this turn of phrase a bit too literally, a long line of
performers from Limp Bizkit to Kanye West have since enlisted Co-
hen’s word of choice toward purportedly lyrical ends.144 Today, public
decency and public order laws rarely constrain vulgar language.145
Paul Cohen’s jacket may still be relatively rare in courtrooms, but
most of George Carlin’s “seven dirty words” are now common in public
settings (even if the Federal Communications Commission still throws
occasional fits over broadcast expletives).146
Abner Kneeland, Walter Chaplinsky, and Paul Cohen remind us
that in earlier times in this country, legal, political, and even cultural
discourse aligned to endorse the reasonableness of criminal restric-
tions upon blasphemous, hostile, and vulgar language. Today, most of
these lines have shifted considerably. You and I can say almost any-
thing to anyone.147 We can say words that damage others emotionally
and psychologically.148 We can disparage deities and mock the people
who worship them.149 We can invoke phrases intended to provoke and
143. Id. at 25.
144. See, e.g., LIMP BIZKIT, Hot Dog, on CHOCOLATE STARFISH AND THE HOT DOG FLA-
VORED WATER (Flip & Interscope Records 2000); KANYE WEST, Two Words, on THE
COLLEGE DROPOUT (Def Jam Recordings & Roc-A-Fella Records 2004).
145. This paragraph draws from John Inazu, Please Join Me in Expressing Displea-
sure with the Draft, COMMENT (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.cardus.ca/comment/
article/please-join-me-in-expressing-displeasure-with-the-draft/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/4Z8U-JLDE].
146. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Jean M. Twenge,
Hannah VanLandingham & W. Keith Campbell, The Seven Words You Can Never
Say on Television: Increases in the Use of Swear Words in American Books,
1950–2008, SAGE OPEN, July–Sept. 2017, at 1, 2, 4 (using Google Books database
of five million books to track the increased prevalence of Carlin’s seven dirty
words in American books and finding that “[r]eaders of books in the late 2000s
were 28 times more likely than those in the early 1950s to come across one of the
‘seven words you can never say on television’”).
147. JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP
DIFFERENCE 93 (2016) [hereinafter INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM].
148. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (“Speech is powerful. It can
stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did
here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by
punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate.”).
149. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952) (“It is not the busi-
ness of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a
particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or
motion pictures.” (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940))).
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offend.150 Part of this shift is owed to the expansion and entrench-
ment of First Amendment speech protections.151
The relatively few examples where direct restriction of speech is
permissible under the First Amendment illustrate the reasonableness
lines and their contested nature. For example, almost all sexually ex-
plicit speech is legally permissible under the First Amendment. How-
ever, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California permits
restrictions on speech or expression that “appeals to the prurient in-
terest” and “depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,” sexual
conduct or excretory functions.152 Kathleen Sullivan has aptly ob-
served that the Miller test requires obscene material to “turn you on
and gross you out” at the same time.153 But the category of obscenity
is further constrained by “the average person, applying contemporary
community standards.”154 In 1983, the Second Circuit concluded that
“detailed portrayals of genitalia, sexual intercourse, fellatio, and mas-
turbation” were not obscene in light of community standards prevail-
ing in New York City.155 That was over thirty years ago.156 Today,
only a fraction of sexually explicit material meets the Miller definition
for obscenity.157
150. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding damages
were not allowed to be awarded simply “because the speech in question may have
an adverse emotional impact on the audience”).
151. See generally INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM, supra note 147, at 93–96 (summariz-
ing argument).
152. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). The Court’s full test is as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards” would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
153. Quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 2004 NEW ATLANTIS 75, 77 (2004).
154. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
155. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., 709 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir.
1983).
156. Consider in this light the implausibility of Justice Stevens’s assertion in a 2002
dissent that “[t]he kind of hard-core pornography” at issue in Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) “would be obscene under any community’s standard”
and “does not belong on the Internet.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 611 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The brochure at issue in Hamling included “pictures
portraying heterosexual and homosexual intercourse, sodomy and a variety of de-
viate sexual acts” involving one or more people, and, in two instances, a woman
and a horse. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 92–93.
157. The few constraints placed upon the content of commercially available pornogra-
phy usually come from mainstream suppliers like General Motors, Hilton Hotels,
and Time Warner rather than from the state’s obscenity laws. See Timothy Egan,
Erotica Inc. – A Special Report.; Technology Sent Wall Street Into Market for Por-
nography, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/us/er-
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Restrictions on defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) provide another example. The IIED tort restricts “ex-
treme and outrageous” speech or conduct.158 But the standard is met
only “where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity.”159 In practice, not much defamatory or emotionally distres-
sing speech will be so beyond unreasonable that it is also legally
impermissible.
Indeed, few examples of controversial speech will rise to the level
of legally impermissible. And yet there is also a great deal of speech
that is clearly impermissible under the law. As Frederick Schauer has
observed, the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions against
securities fraud, perjury, criminal conspiracy, and other forms of com-
munication that fall plainly under the definition of “speech.”160 These
restrictions are uncontroversial precisely because the contextualized
words that they constrain are widely understood to be beyond unrea-
sonable. Some expressive restrictions never amount to legal claims be-
cause litigants, lawyers, and judges find them to be unassailable. This
recognition may manifest at many stages of the litigation process—in
the initial decision of a potential litigant not to raise a claim, in the
strategic decision of counsel to argue another legal theory, in the deci-
sion of a judge to find a lack of standing, or in a dismissal based on
frivolity.
Schauer has described the underlying factors justifying these re-
strictions as “the often mysterious political, social, cultural, historical,
psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces that influence which
policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not.”161
Yet even the core examples of speech that Schauer argues lie outside
otica-special-report-technology-sent-wall-street-into-market-for-pornography
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/P4LU-M3QQ]. As Ronald Collins and David Skover
have argued, “In effect, nothing is commercially obscene unless the captains of
commerce fear that it manifestly repulses mass tastes or offends mass values.”
RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 148 (2d ed.
2005).
158. Conduct can be extreme without being outrageous (climbing Everest) or outra-
geous without being extreme (marital infidelity). See generally DAN B. DOBBS,
PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 615–22 (8th ed.
2017).
159. Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos., 49 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (N.Y. 2016) (quoting Howell v.
N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993)). Chanko’s family sued after ABC
News aired footage of a loved one dying without their consent. Though the court
believed the conduct “reprehensible,” it did not think that it rose to the level of
“extreme and outrageous.” Id. at 1179.
160. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Ex-
ploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765–66 (2004).
161. Id. at 1768.
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the boundaries of the First Amendment raise borderline questions of
reasonableness. Take the example of criminal conspiracy. Schauer
correctly notes that the First Amendment does not preclude the “vast
domain of criminal law that deals with conspiracy and criminal solici-
tation.”162 But the history of the modern First Amendment is shaped
by challenges to precisely these kinds of restrictions, which push the
lines of reasonableness and permissibility in the law.163
D. Unreasonableness in Contact Sports
In May 2019, heavyweight champion Deontay Wilder made head-
lines when he announced that boxing “is the only sport where you can
kill a man and get paid for it at the same time.”164 Wilder was refer-
ring to his upcoming title bout against Dominic Breazeale. He warned
that Breazeale’s “life is on the line for this fight, and I do mean his
life.”165 According to Wilder, boxing is a “gladiator’s sport,” and since
it is legal to kill someone in the ring, “Why not use my right to do
so?”166 Wilder emphasized that he wanted to “get me a body” on his
record.167 The head of the World Boxing Council, Mauricio Sulaiman,
responded somewhat tepidly on Twitter that Wilder’s comments were
“regrettable and completely against the spirit of our sport.”168 The
“metaphors,” according to Sulaiman, were “against the WBC code of
ethics.”169
Still, Wilder’s comments accurately describe the typical lack of
criminal culpability if an opponent dies as the result of a sanctioned
match.170 Writing in Business Insider, Alan Dawson found Wilder’s
162. Id. at 1784.
163. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
164. Alan Dawson, Deontay Wilder’s Desire to ‘Get Me a Body’ on His Boxing Record by
Killing an Opponent Makes a Mockery of the Fighters Who Have Died Through




166. Id.; Josh Peter, Deontay Wilder on Saturday Night’s Opponent: ‘If He Dies, He
Dies’, USA TODAY (May 15, 2019, 5:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/boxing/2019/05/15/boxing-deontay-wilder-dominic-breazeale-if-he-dies-he-
dies/3678409002/ [https://perma.unl.edu/CL57-J5UK].
167. Dawson, supra note 164. This was not the first time that Wilder said he “want[s]
a body on [his] record.” Dan Rafael, Deontay Wilder: ‘I Want a Body on My Re-
cord’, ESPN (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.espn.com/boxing/story/_/id/22969165/
deontay-wilder-want-body-my-record [https://perma.unl.edu/KU9Y-FY52].
168. Mauricio Sulaiman (@wbcmoro), TWITTER (May 16, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/wbcmoro/status/1129061349902831616?lang=en.
169. Id.
170. See Jeffrey Standen, The Manly Sports: The Problematic Use of Criminal Law to
Regulate Sports Violence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 619, 620 (2009) (“As-
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comments “certainly controversial, especially as boxing history is lit-
tered with the corpses of fighters who have died in the ring or shortly
after competing.”171 As Dawson noted, twenty-three-year-old Bradley
Stone died in 1994 after hits to the head during a fight at the Peacock
Gym in Canning Town, London.172 A statue outside the gym, Dawson
noted, “acts as a constant reminder to respect the sport and its
combatants.”173
Sports like boxing require direct physical contact that would in
other contexts constitute an intentional tort or criminal battery (or, in
cases of death, a criminal homicide). In addition to boxing, MMA fight-
ing, football, hockey, and lacrosse frequently require and sometimes
encourage forceful body blows. Soccer and basketball players are less
prone to regular blows, but occasional “hard fouls” create a nonzero
risk of similar consequences.174 Participants in these activities waive
their right to pursue a legal remedy for injuries incurred during the
normal course of play.175 Tort law recognizes assumption of risk as an
saults and batteries that would render an athlete subject to criminal prosecution
were they to occur away from the playing field are considered ‘part of the game’
when they happen during the course of a violent sport.”).
171. Dawson, supra note 164. For further coverage of Wilder’s comments, see James
Corrigan, ‘I Want a Body on My Record’: Deontay Wilder’s Comments Are a Dis-
grace, but We the Boxing Public Are to Blame, TELEGRAPH (May 15, 2019, 5:06
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/boxing/2019/05/15/want-body-record-deontay-
wilders-comments-disgrace-boxing-public/ [https://perma.unl.edu/82NP-6ARH]
(“When you read Deontay Wilder’s comments ahead of his WBC heavyweight title
defence against Dominic Breazeale in New York on Saturday, what do you feel?
Disgust, I would imagine, revulsion at one human being declaring he wants to
kill another human being purely because he is allowed to in the name of his
sport.”); and Robert Morales, Deontay Wilder May Be a Jerk, but He’ll Still KO
Dominic Breazeale, L.A. DAILY NEWS (May 17, 2019, 9:37 AM), https://
www.dailynews.com/2019/05/17/deontay-wilder-may-be-a-jerk-but-hell-still-ko-
dominic-breazeale/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7UCA-4FSM] (discussing the “bad
blood” between Wilder and Breazeale and the dislike that “is real, unlike how it
often is in boxing when trash is being talked for the sake of higher ticket sales
and TV ratings”).
172. Dawson, supra note 164.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Rob Hughes, Different Standards, and Penalties, for Rough Play, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/sports/soccer/06iht-
SOCCER.html [ https://perma.unl.edu/EG6J-92WS] (discussing severe soccer in-
juries); Pat Mixon, NBA’s Hard Knock Life: The 10 Hardest Fouls of All Time,
BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 14, 2010), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/540874-hard-
knock-life-the-nbas-top-10-hardest-fouls-of-all-time#slide1 [https://perma.unl.
edu/4MH4-E7WX] (discussing equally severe injuries in basketball).
175. It is rare for athletes to face criminal charges for their activities on the field or
court. See Danny Cevallos, Why Athletes Generally Don’t Face Criminal Charges
for On-Court Fights, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/sports/why-athletes-generally-don-t-face-criminal-charges-court-
fights-n922866 [https://perma.unl.edu/AB7T-V2S9]. Generally, “[a]ssaults and
batteries that would render an athlete subject to criminal prosecution were they
to occur away from the playing field are considered ‘part of the game’ when they
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affirmative defense that can be raised against a negligence action.176
Individuals who voluntarily expose themselves to a known risk or haz-
ardous condition may be prevented from recovering damages if they
sustain injuries from the risk or condition.177 The theoretical justifica-
tion for this doctrine is that the knowing assumption of risk removes
the legal duty that would otherwise have been owed by the
defendant.178
To mitigate the physical risks of play, officially sanctioned sports
establish rules or norms that restrict the most egregious forms of con-
tact. Participants who veer too far afield from these restrictions can
exceed the boundaries of consent to the point of being criminally lia-
ble.179 For example, if Deontay Wilder directed his punches toward
happen during the course of a violent sport.” Standen, supra note 170. In rare
cases, states have statutory exemptions for contact sports. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. § 708.1(3)(a) (West 2019) (“An act . . . shall not be an assault . . . [i]f the
person doing any of the enumerated acts, and such other person, are voluntary
participants in a sport, social or other activity, not in itself criminal, and such act
is a reasonably foreseeable incident of such sport or activity, and does not create
an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach of the peace.”).
176. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (listing “assumption of risk” as an affirmative defense);
see also JILL D. WEINBERG, CONSENSUAL VIOLENCE: SEX, SPORTS, AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF INJURY 7 (2016) (“In tort law, assumption of risk is a form of implicit con-
sent that bars or reduces a person’s ability to recover damages . . . .”).
177. See Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986) (“At
common law an employee’s voluntary, knowledgeable acceptance of a dangerous
condition that is necessary for him to perform his duties constitutes an assump-
tion of risk.”); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 480–81 (5th ed. 1984).
178. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707–08 (Cal. 1992) (“In cases involving
‘primary assumption of risk’—where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and
the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to pro-
tect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury—the
doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.” (em-
phasis added)); see also id. at 708 (“Although defendants generally have no legal
duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself,
it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not
to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.
Thus, although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it
clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, work-
ing condition so as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm.”).
179. See Standen, supra note 170 (“[I]n unusual, but not entirely rare, cases . . . the
act of violence on the playing field subject[s] the participant to a risk of criminal
prosecution. These cases typically involve a rather egregious act of violent assault
that gains public notoriety and that so far transgresses the stated and unstated
norms of the game to render the public prosecution relatively unproblematic.”);
see also State v. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We have no
doubt that defendant and his victims had been participants. Given that play had
officially ceased, that an altercation had broken out, and that defendant and
some of his victims had been on the sidelines and not engaged in play activities, it
is clear that defendant and his victims were not, at that time, ‘voluntary partici-
pants in a sport.’”); Jeremy W. Peters & Liz Robbins, 5 Pacers and 5 Fans Are
Charged in Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/
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Dominic Breazeale’s head and refused to relent after interventions by
the ring officials, he could be liable for criminal homicide if Breazeale
died.180 The legal analysis would focus on whether Wilder’s conduct
constituted an inherent part of the sport and whether a reasonable
player would have understood and foreseen that risk entering into the
contest, thereby consenting to that kind of conduct.
What counts as reasonable in sports “hinges on whether the cost of
an untaken precaution outweighs that of a particular harm.”181 Play-
ers owe no duty to each other when injurious activity is an inherent
part of the sport. This baseline effectively “brand[s] a broad range of
risky activities reasonable as a matter of law.”182 For example, a bas-
ketball player might expect “a certain amount of pushing and shoving
for position, the occasional elbow, and a fair number of open-handed
slaps.”183 But activity that the player would not reasonably foresee—
like “suddenly being set upon from the side or rear with a flurry of
punches to the head”—could trigger liability.184
The law often assumes that “[a]nyone who participates in an or-
ganized, socially approved recreational activity is fully aware of the
possibility of injury due to a violation of the rules of play, yet the deci-
sion to play may be perfectly reasonable.”185 For this reason, many
states expect athletes to “know the risks that are simply inherent in
all sports and recreational activities,” and thus, “refuse to impose tort
liability for negligence in sports.”186 But jurisdictions are beginning to
find that injurious activity in sports is no longer “reasonable” when
the conduct is reckless or intentional.187 A state court in Illinois found
that:
09/sports/basketball/5-pacers-and-5-fans-are-charged-in-fight.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/R5NJ-VFTL] (athletes charged for role in brawl during Pacers-
Pistons NBA game).
180. Or criminal attempt short of death. Cf. Gabe Feldman, Legal Action in Wake of
Saints ‘Bounty’ Revelations Not Likely, NFL.COM (Mar. 4, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://
www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82761060/article/legal-action-in-wake-of-
saints-bounty-revelations-not-likely [https://perma.unl.edu/68YG-CVQ2] (provid-
ing legal analysis of New Orleans Saints’ “bounty” scheme); Lester Munson, Le-
gal Action Unlikely in Saints’ Bounties, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2012), https://
www.espn.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/munson-120306/new-orleans-
saints-bounty-system-unlikely-result-legal-action [https://perma.unl.edu/-T9N3]
(additional legal analysis on Saints’ “bounty” scheme).
181. David Horton, Extreme Sports and Assumption of Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 599, 599 (2004).
182. Id. at 625.
183. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d at 923.
184. Id.
185. Segoviano v. Hous. Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
186. J. Russell VerSteeg, A Case for a Bill Recognizing Primary Assumption of Risk as
Limiting Liability for Persons and Providers Who Take Part in Sports & Recrea-
tional Activities, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2013).
187. Id. at 60.
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[W]hen athletes are engaged in an athletic competition; all teams involved are
trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel; a recognized set of rules
governs the conduct of the competition; and a safety rule is contained therein
which is primarily designed to protect players from serious injury, a player is
then charged with a legal duty to every other player on the field to refrain
from conduct proscribed by a safety rule.188
For these state courts, the harm to which an intentionally or reck-
lessly dangerous player subjects another player is unreasonable—
even in the context of relatively dangerous contact sports. But if par-
ticipants and players stick to the “rules,” even serious injury or death
may just be “part of the game.”189
Some more established sports purport to offset these risks with ap-
peals to positive virtues like “exercise, teamwork, and skill-build-
ing”190 along with “self-discipline, self-respect, work ethic,
determination, and leadership and motivation of others.”191 Even
courts have recognized that these attributes make games like flag
football “healthy, socially desirable organized recreational ac-
tivit[ies],” in contrast to “socially undesirable” activities.192
The tradeoff between the risk of bodily harm and the benefit of
virtue-cultivation factors into cultural assessments of the reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness of recreational activities. For example, for
many years, cultural representations of American football emphasized
its positive virtues and downplayed its risks. But recent studies have
shown how concussions and repeated hits to the head in football lead
to chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), which kills brain cells
and has been linked to “behavioral and personality changes, memory
188. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
189. Some commentators are asking related questions concerning the reasonableness
of youth participation in sports which include aspects that are inherently danger-
ous. See, e.g., Tony Cooper, Youth Sports—Too Dangerous?/Are Youth Sports Too
Harmful?, SFGATE (Jan. 25, 2012, 10:51 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/health/ar-
ticle/Youth-sports-too-dangerous-Are-youth-sports-2715437.php [https://
perma.unl.edu/AL4M-6KNK]; Jon Lackman, Is It Wrong to Let Children Do Ex-
treme Sports?, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/
magazine/is-it-wrong-to-let-children-do-extreme-sports.html [https://perma.unl.
edu/868L-8WLK]; Is Sport More Dangerous Than Ever?, BBC NEWS (July 12,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-33478629 [https://perma.unl.edu/Z4DG-
6SUX].
190. Horton, supra note 181, at 653.
191. Jennifer A. Brobst, Why Public Health Policy Should Redefine Consent to Assault
and the Intentional Foul in Gladiator Sports, 29 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 22 (2015).
192. Segoviano v. Hous. Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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loss, and speech problems.”193 Risks may be greatest for players who
start young.194
The greater cultural attention to the risks of football has caused a
decline in youth participation. The National Federation of State High
School Associations reports that football enrollment has dropped by
6.6% in the last ten years.195 One Illinois study found that the number
of state football players dropped by 14.8% over the last five years.196
Nobody is seriously suggesting outlawing football, but we might con-
clude that cultural assessments of football are shifting from viewing it
as reasonable to unreasonable.
These cultural assessments are complicated by differences emerg-
ing around race and class. The Illinois study on decline of youth foot-
ball in the state also showed that low-income players began to fill
about 25% more of these football rosters.197 Nationwide, the percent-
age of white boys playing middle and high school football is dropping
as they leave for “safer” sports like baseball or lacrosse; meanwhile,
the percentage of Black boys playing football is rising.198 Some major-
ity-white towns are dropping varsity football programs, while major-
193. Alana Semuels, The White Flight from Football, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2019, 5:41
PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/02/football-white-flight-
racial-divide/581623/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ZA94-PC4T]. In an American Medi-
cal Association study, researchers found CTE in 110 out of the 111 brains of for-
mer NFL players assessed. Jesse Mez et al., Clinicopathological Evaluation of
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Players of American Football, 318 J. AM.
MED. ASSOC. 360, 362 (2017), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/
2645104 [https://perma.unl.edu/U2MV-GQNH]; see also Associated Press, Ollie
Matson Paid Steep Price for Hall of Fame Career, ESPN (July 29, 2017, 12:04
PM), https://www.espn.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=20191751 [https://
perma.unl.edu/N8MG-YW3N] (detailing NFL Hall-of-Famer Ollie Matson’s
struggle with cognitive decline likely due to the CTE found in his brain after his
death); Richard Gonzales, Researcher Says Aaron Hernandez’s Brain Showed
Signs of Severe CTE, NPR (Nov. 9, 2017, 9:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/11/09/563194252/researcher-says-aaron-hernandez-s-brain-
showed-signs-of-severe-cte [https://perma.unl.edu/KA83-VALL] (describing the
CTE found in Aaron Hernandez’s brain after he committed suicide while in
prison for murder).
194. A Wake Forest University study found that eight- to thirteen-year-old boys with
only one season of tackle football experience had diminished brain function.
Semuels, supra note 193. A Boston University study found similar results: “Ath-
letes who begin playing tackle football before the age of 12 have . . . three times as
much of a risk of clinical depression as athletes who begin playing after 12 . . . .”
Id.
195. Amanda Morris & Michel Martin, Poor Students More Likely to Play Football,





198. Semuels, supra note 193.
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ity-Black areas are expanding theirs.199 And in college, the percentage
of NCAA Division I football players who are Black is increasing; the
percentage of white players is decreasing.200
The racial and class implications factor into reasonableness assess-
ments and raise important questions of agency and choice. As the Na-
tion asks: “What’s a little permanent brain damage when you’re facing
a life of debilitating poverty?”201 Not all families have the “luxury” of
worrying about “long-term, sort of abstract damages to these kids.”202
For lower-income families, “playing football is still worth the risk, be-
cause they’re trying to avoid other dangers.”203 Football—unlike other
sports—has a low entry barrier: “[T]here are so many positions that
rely on differing capabilities.”204 And football can mean receiving fi-
nancial aid to an elite private high school or getting a college scholar-
ship (the odds are much better in football than in any other sport).205
As universities continue to profit considerably from ticket sales,
broadcasting fees, licensing, and bowl game payouts,206 they are offer-
ing more football scholarships to expand their programs.207
Meanwhile, some wealthier families that no longer allow their chil-
dren to play football still celebrate “the country’s most cherished pas-
time: watching large men give each other life-threatening concussions
. . . as . . . the next generation of Alzheimer’s patients and suicide
victims ride[s] on to national glory.”208 Upper-class families are pull-
ing their children out of football, but they continue to watch NFL foot-
ball on Sunday afternoons.209 Is football a reasonable recreational
activity today? It depends.
On the other hand, we no longer allow duels. You and I cannot
show up to a field with pistols, walk ten paces, turn around, and fire at
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Mychal Denzel Smith, For Black Boys, the NFL—and Traumatic Brain Injury—
Can Be Lottery Tickets, NATION (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/arti
cle/black-boys-nfl-and-traumatic-brain-injury-can-be-lottery-tickets/.




206. See Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams: Texas A&M Jumps to
No. 1, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/
2018/09/11/college-footballs-most-valuable-teams/#2c1fee946c64 [https://
perma.unl.edu/WEM8-PC45] (discussing various colleges’ football revenue
streams). Texas A&M University has averaged, over the course of three seasons,
annual revenues of $148 million per year through its football program. Id.
207. Id.
208. Smith, supra note 201.
209. Semuels, supra note 193. They may be watching even more football than previ-
ously: NFL ratings were up last season. Id.
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each other.210 And we cannnot engage in actual gladiator matches. So,
dueling and gladiator fights are beyond unreasonable and impermissi-
ble—the law does not allow waiver of tort or criminal remedies to en-
gage in these activities. In contrast, football and boxing lie somewhere
between reasonable and unreasonable, permitting waiver and as-
sumption of risk within the “normal” course of play. Meanwhile, a host
of other recreational activities are apparently reasonable despite their
risk of death or serious injury: every year, people die rock climbing
(with and without equipment), parachuting, BASE jumping, hang
gliding, scuba diving, skiing, snowboarding, bicycling, car racing, fly-
ing airplanes, canoeing, swimming, running, and even walking.211
210. Although romanticized in social narratives as a common and somewhat brazen
practice, dueling was both regulated and rare at its cultural height. Warren F.
Schwartz, Keith Baxter & David Ryan, The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting
Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322 (1984). As a practice, southern dueling
was governed by a clear, detailed set of rules—the Wilson Code—which created a
negotiation process modeled on principal-agent theory that often resulted in non-
lethal resolution. Id. at 321–22. This code required the offended and offender to
use “seconds,” go-between agents who were to be “cool and collected,” and seek a
nonviolent resolution with each other. JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR;
OR RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELLING 8
(1838). If nonviolent dispute resolution failed, the Code contained very strict re-
quirements about what fighting positions were permitted, who could and must be
present (e.g., a doctor), and which guns could be used. Id. at 13–16. These rules—
especially those governing firearm selection—reduced the likelihood of fatalities
by “increas[ing] the chance of misfire.” Schwartz, Baxter & Ryan, supra, at
321–23. Ten Duel Commandments, from Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton musi-
cal, tracks the rules contained within the so-called Wilson Code with impressive
historical accuracy. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, Ten Duel Commandments, on HAMIL-
TON (Hamilton Uptown, LLC 2015).
211. Your Chances of Dying Ranked by Sport and Activity, TETON GRAVITY RES. (July
24, 2019), https://www.tetongravity.com/story/news/your-chances-of-dying-
ranked-by-sport-and-activity [https://perma.unl.edu/G2MV-JEAL].  But even this
list reveals differences in the risks and perceptions of these activities. Most peo-
ple would not consider running beyond unreasonable (at least from a risk stand-
point), but solo climbing is more controversial. See FREE SOLO (National
Geographic Documentary Films 2018); Jason Guerrasio, The Directors of Oscar-
Winning Documentary ‘Free Solo’ Explain Why They Made the Risky Decision to
Film Alex Honnold’s 3,000 Foot Climb up El Capitan Without a Rope, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:27 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/free-solo-docu
mentary-directors-interview-filming-alex-honnold-el-capitan-climb-without-rope-
2018-9 [https://perma.unl.edu/2N23-WC8Y]. Or consider BASE jumping—leap-
ing from Buildings, Antennas, Spans (bridges), or Earth—with only a single par-
achute while dodging cliffs, buildings, or cables. Cynthia Dizikes, BASE Jumpers
Fall for Thrill-Seeking Lifestyle, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 22, 2011), https://www.chicago
tribune./news/ct-xpm-2011-04-22-ct-met-basejumping-20110421-story.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/9LTX-8BE8]. Because BASE jumpers typically have less
than ten seconds between jumping and landing, their first parachute is their only
parachute; they do not have time to attempt to deploy a backup. Horton, supra
note 181, at 622. As of November 24, 2019, 381 BASE jumpers have died from the
activity since the BASE jumping community began tracking fatalities in 1981.
BASE Fatality List, BLINC MAG., https://www.blincmagazine.com/forum/wiki_in
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The reasonableness of our play, which factors into the law’s base-
lines for assumption of risk, is not solely a function of risk of harm,
and it isn’t quite determined by “social value.” Rather, the reasonable-
ness of our play appears to rely on a more malleable cultural assess-
ment of the community—or communities—that engage in them as
participants, spectators, consumers, and marketers. Underlying these
judgments are a complex set of aesthetic preferences, financial incen-
tives, and cultural narratives. And here, as with the way that we pun-
ish, people suffer and die within purportedly reasonable activities.
V. CONCLUSION
The previous Part explored the reasonableness lines across four
seemingly disparate areas of law: tax policy, criminal punishment,
speech restrictions, and tort liability for inherently dangerous sports.
The breadth of these applications illustrates the extent to which rea-
sonableness permeates legal inquiries. But it’s not just reasonable-
ness—each of these subject matter case studies also included
examples of behavior deemed beyond unreasonable: construing por-
nography as a medical expense, cutting off someone’s hand as punish-
ment, and killing someone in a boxing match. And, it turns out, this is
true across many other legal categories—we need to account not only
for the divide between reasonable and unreasonable but also the addi-
tional line of beyond unreasonable. Some actions that are beyond un-
reasonable are legally impermissible; others remain permissible but
still grossly violate our collective norms.
Many of these reasonableness determinations will be contested
and viewed differently by different individuals or communities. Some-
times our assessments will shift: a belief or action previously accepted
as reasonable will be deemed unreasonable (and, in some cases, a pre-
viously legal action will be made illegal). Or conversely, an action once
understood as unreasonable or even beyond unreasonable will become
accepted as reasonable (and, in some cases, a previously illegal action
will be legalized). At the same time, not all of our reasonableness as-
sessments are fully malleable. Legal, political, and cultural judgments
about reasonableness sometimes calcify. Every society sets limits to
the pluralism it will tolerate, and some of these limits are so en-
trenched that it would be difficult to conceive of their shifting.
dex.php?title=BASE_Fatality_List [https://perma.unl.edu/9EXU-YDWA] (last up-
dated June 4, 2020). In addition to the incredibly high risks, BASE jumping does
not require substantial skill or affirmative conduct: “BASE jumpers perform one
action—pulling their ripcords—during the course of an event that spans a mere
ten seconds. Sky diving, by contrast, lasts about seven minutes and requires ma-
neuvering to stay on course. . . . BASE jumping offers little more than risk itself.”
Horton, supra note 181, at 627.
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The partial malleability and historical contingency of the reasona-
bleness lines might make us question the stability of these lines or
tempt us to abandon them as altogether incoherent. But those re-
sponses are neither possible nor wise. Even with all of their problems,
the reasonableness lines remain important sorting mechanisms
within the law. Moreover, contingent but widespread agreement that
some actions or beliefs are reasonable, unreasonable, or beyond unrea-
sonable gives us a starting point for naming shared values, which is a
prerequisite to naming a political common good.212
The line between reasonable and unreasonable can determine
what is legal or illegal, or when people are held liable or not liable for
their actions. The line between unreasonable and beyond unreasona-
ble can decide who is included within the acceptable boundaries of so-
ciety: at some point, people who hold beyond unreasonable views may
themselves be seen as beyond unreasonable. Most of us do not think
this about most people. Most of us can usually separate people from
the ideas they hold.
When and whether it is appropriate to collapse the distinction—to
cast people and groups outside the boundaries of acceptable society for
their beliefs and actions—is a complicated question of social norms
and politics. The answer to that question lies beyond the scope of this
Article. But the descriptive endeavor on these pages is an important
baseline from which to ask the question, particularly given the stakes.
Much in the law—and much in political and cultural discourse—de-
pends upon determinations of reasonableness. And while reasonable-
ness remains a useful heuristic, what counts as reasonable or
unreasonable is far too often taken for granted. Critiquing and compli-
cating these unreflective assumptions reveals the complicated ques-
tions of theory and normativity underlying the social, moral, and
dynamic dimensions of reasonableness. We need to question unthink-
ing assertions of what counts as reasonable or unreasonable—includ-
ing our own.
212. In past work, I have cautioned against conflating “common ground” with “the
common good,” and I continue to believe that a politically viable common good
can only be thinly comprised, akin to something like a “modest unity.” INAZU,
CONFIDENT PLURALISM, supra note 147, at 119–24, 131–33. As Luke Bretherton
has noted, attempting to name the common good of a nation as large and diverse
as America “denies the plurality and contestability of moral visions in complex
societies and the conflicts that arise in pursuit of divergent moral goods, all of
which must be negotiated through politics.” LUKE BRETHERTON, CHRIST AND THE
COMMON LIFE 32–33 n.13 (2019).
